THEOLOGY

VOL. XLV AUGUST, 1942 No. 266

EDITORIAL

PLANNING FOR WHAT?

THE word "planning" evokes as favourable a response in some minds as unfavourable in others. The confidence of the men of science that, as soon as they get the opportunity, they will be able to put the world to rights by the efficient use of modern technics is as superficial as the refusal of other intellectuals to take a serious interest in the prospect is misplaced. It is easy to say that too many areas of life are planned already, and to suppose that all one can do and all one need do is to try to preserve the few remaining areas intact or uncontrolled by bureaucrats. Those who are concerned about a revival of English culture, or of English agriculture, or with the tasks of Christian evangelization, will make a fatal mistake if they leave to other people the running of the planned society that has become inevitable, trusting that they will be able to pursue their aims whoever wields power at the top.

The reason why there has to be centralized control and direction in our society, as never before, is not that a majority or even a minority of us want it to be so, nor that it is essential for the prosecution of the war. The reason is that an industrialized society like ours, which has accepted the full use of machinery, is so complicated that it will work efficiently only if it is centrally planned. A machine society is like a railway system: its members cannot be left to do things in their own way; that would spell chaos, or at least intolerable inefficiency. It is thus the technical character of a modern society, and not merely the perverse acquiescence of the masses or the egregious ambition of would-be planners or power-mongers, that makes central planning inevitable. Those two factors are indeed extremely serious elements in the situation. The acquiescence of the masses and the ambitions of the few are there right enough, and the consequence is that, whatever the outcome

of the war, some form of dictatorial totalitarianism[1] is practically certain, unless the danger is realized, and society as a whole resolves to follow some other course, and learns how to do so.

There are those who say in private, if not in public, that a period of unconcealed dictatorship would be no bad thing, and that it may be the most effective and rapid, perhaps the only, way of carrying through the necessary social changes. It is fondly supposed that it would be possible subsequently to recover democratic methods of government. This illusion is encouraged by Marxists, who talk about the State withering away after the dictatorship of the proletariat has done its work. Marx himself may be excused for believing that there would be a natural transition from dictatorship to liberty, for he could point to historical precedents, and he could not know that by the twentieth century new technics in industry, warfare and propaganda would have been invented which tell in the opposite direction and make the overthrow of a dictatorship from within, once it has been established, a far more formidable undertaking than it has ever been before. Indeed, it has yet to be shown that it can be done at all. The case, therefore, for avoiding a violent revolution and the setting up of any form of dictatorship is paramount.

It is to be feared that many Christians and others, who are now busily engaged in advocating social reconstruction, do not sufficiently realize this. It is all to the good, and all too late, that the discovery is being made that the Christian faith has social implications. But those who have only recently woken up to this fact are prone to see those implications in terms of economic equality and security, better housing, the abolition of unemployment, raising of the school age, etc.; in a word, in terms of a program which a generation ago might have been summed up as the provision of social justice.[2] They do not perceive that, important as all these things are, it can with much force be urged that a dictatorship would deliver them more

[1] By "totalitarianism" we mean a dictatorial and collectivist state which seeks to guide the whole community according to its own will, and to extend its control over culture, the national ethos and philosophy of life. *Cp.* Nils Ehrenström, *Christian Faith and the Modern State* (1937), p. 228.

[2] The writer may be pardoned for mentioning that twenty years ago, as a newly ordained deacon, he was advocating all these things on I.L.P. platforms.

rapidly and efficiently than a so-called democracy. Christian propaganda, which puts social justice in the forefront of its demands, may thus be unwittingly preparing the ground on which a dictatorship will be eagerly welcomed.

Whatever form of government we have in the future, it will be bound to supply more in the way of social justice of that kind than we have had heretofore. For instance, no form of government will allow youth from fourteen to eighteen to fend for itself or to rot. This is not the dominant issue of the age. The real problem, which looms over every other, is how to maintain personal freedom and responsibility under the conditions of technocracy. Does efficient social planning inevitably become totalitarian, whether under the name of Fascism, Communism or any other; or is there an alternative way of using these new technics which has yet to be proclaimed as an idea and worked out in practice? If there is, is it not the historical destiny of this country to attempt it?

We anticipated at the beginning of the war that our Government would be driven to exploit more fully the technics which have given to the totalitarian states their efficacy.[1] We did not anticipate that this would be done with so much hesitation and so slowly, or that Britain would get into its stride for total war with such faltering steps. The scruples and obstructions which prevented, and still to some extent prevent, all-out organization for this sort of war were partly creditable—that is, in so far as they arose from a sense that, if the only way to win this war is to go totalitarian ourselves, our weapons are pointed at our own breasts. They are—unless, as we become a planned society, we discover how to plan for a different purpose.

The question, then, is whether it is possible to accept the necessity of planning, but, instead of doing it in such a way as to deprive men of their freedom, to plan with a view to providing, wherever possible, the conditions for the exercise of personal responsibility and decision. Freedom now can be preserved only if it is the deliberate aim of those who have the power to plan, just as responsibility can be decentralized only if that is the object of those who wield authority at the centre.

Such a social purpose would not be specifically Christian, nor is the freedom for which we can plan "the freedom

[1] See THEOLOGY, October, 1939, p. 244.

of a Christian man " or " the glorious liberty of the children of God," but it would be of vital concern to Christians, since where men have not been trained to exercise responsibility and have no real freedom of decision the Gospel has no means of address.[1] A social purpose under the banner of " Planning for Freedom " should enlist the support of all non-Christian men of good will as well. To be achieved, it would in fact need to be accepted by all parties and classes. If, as at present, a large number of groups or movements that are agitated about social planning all go on paddling their little canoes in competition with one another, they all stand to fail, for, while they are talking and disputing, the way will be left open for a dictator to step in and say: " An end to this idealistic chatter! It is time to act. I have a plan, and I intend to deliver the goods which you only talk about."

The working out in detail of an agreed social strategy which would implement the purpose of planning for freedom is not the peculiar province of THEOLOGY nor of theologians. But, to take one illustration, it should be fairly obvious to all that in the field of education it would be necessary to think in terms not merely of raising the school age nor of securing religious instruction, but of training future citizens in the exercise of responsible freedom and of subordinating the requirements of the industrial system to this. That is to say, industry would no longer be allowed to have the first claim on the youth of the country, whether at the age of fourteen or sixteen. Continued education would not be an addition to or insertion in juvenile employment. Juvenile employment would be treated as an element in education and might start at different ages, according to the nature of the employment and the aptitudes of the individuals concerned. The Ministry of Labour would have to play second fiddle to the Board of Education. This would involve far-reaching social changes, and it could not be carried through in a moment. Something in the nature of a Five Years' Plan would be needed to begin with.

[1] We do not exclude the possibility that a totalitarian régime might be instituted here which would purchase the support of the Churches by assuming a " Christian " complexion and by holding out tempting inducements, for example, in the field of education; but, if the bait were accepted, it would in the end of the day mean apostasy. On the meaning of " Christian Freedom " see an article by Mr Christopher Dawson in *The Dublin Review* (July, 1942).

But obviously we cannot here fill in the whole picture in detail. It is, however, the duty of anyone who sees the way the wind is blowing to direct attention to the signs of the times. It seems to us evident that, unless very soon a fresh political movement arises which will express the resolution of the nation to pursue the kind of social purpose of which we have spoken, it will be too late, and that Christians will then have to prepare a very different strategy. Indeed, the present writer has previously given it as his opinion that it is already too late. But the situation remains strangely ambiguous. On the one hand there is a minority which, however divided in its counsels, is becoming increasingly aware of the menace and eager to avert it; but, on the other hand, there appears to be an appalling apathy among the masses, an absence of any real desire for responsibility and an indifference to its departure.

It seems to us now that, as long as there is any possibility that a realistic national movement may emerge which is directed towards maintaining and increasing the opportunities of personal and local freedom in the age of technocracy, Christians must not only wait and see, but must do all they can to stimulate and forward such a movement. Those who stand aloof or who are interested only in long-term policies with an eventual new Christendom in view are, we suspect, assuming in their heart of hearts that *it cannot happen here*; or they are assuming that they will be able to go on with their long-term hopes when it has happened. As to that, is it really necessary to wait and see? Can we not *look* and see?

The Church's first duty is to call the people of Britain to repentance and faith, and this note needs to be sounded much more strongly than at present. But what about the works that should follow repentance? Have we no more to say than "Win the war," or "Plan for social justice" (which, as has been said, will by itself play into the hands of a dictatorship), or (having debunked both those ideas) "Go and start communities on the land, and hope for better days"?[1] Is it hopelessly unrealistic to say: "See that as a national community you are called to use modern

[1] On any showing it is good that many of these communities are coming into being (see *Community in a Changing World*, obtainable from Community Service Committee, Chancton, Dartnell Park, West Byfleet, Surrey, 3s. 6d.), and he who has never felt drawn or pushed that way has hardly taken the measure of our problem.

technics in order to plan for freedom"? Admittedly, we do not seem to have the resources in leadership, or intelligence, or imagination, or resolution, or social vitality, to answer this call; but if we came to recognize our desperate need of them, is it beyond the Lord's power to bestow them upon us? At all events, until these questions are manifestly answered in the negative we have no right to abandon our readiness to hear a word to the nation which has yet to be spoken and to commit ourselves to a task which has yet to be defined.

A. R. V.

FROM THE EDITOR'S NOTEBOOK

"There was in 1917 a Ministry of Reconstruction, a veritable paradise for benevolent bureaucrats; the building that housed it now shelters the Passport Office, hinting at international conditions not foreseen by its former occupants."—M. B. Reckitt, *As it Happened* (1941), p. 159.

"As soon . . . as a war passes beyond the tussle of two peoples, as soon as it becomes a world-conflict not only by its area but by the moral quality of its issue for humanity, as soon as one side disowns all moral control and humane conduct at national choice, and thus makes its enemies the champions of conscience and humanity—then love, if it is divine, goes to a Cross, takes up the form and function of righteous judgment, and resists unto blood."—P. T. Forsyth, *The Christian Ethic of War* (1916), p. 171.

"We dream of atheism as a passionate thing, like that which filled the aching and turbid void in the mind of Shelley; or a hard and stony thing, as it showed in Voltaire; or a gross and sensual thing, as it glared in Mirabeau. But atheism is not necessarily dogma: it is not of necessity broadly demarcated from the common practice: its seeds and initial forms are in the common breast. Whenever we turn our face from God, whenever we cease to recognize the actual and living relations between Him and ourselves, we are standing within the verge and acting under the spirit of atheism."—W. E. Gladstone, *The State in its Relations with the Church*[4] (1841), ii, 379.

On the Rite of the Inthronization of Bishops and Archbishops[1]

On April 23, St George's Day, the new Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of All England and Metropolitan, was solemnly inthronized in the cathedral church of Christ in his See-city by the principal Archdeacon of his new diocese. A record of the service was broadcast in its evening program by the B.B.C. In introducing the record, the announcer described the ceremony of Inthronization as "characteristically English," and also as being "as old as the church itself." He then proceeded to describe the glittering assemblage of ecclesiastical and lay personages present, prominent among whom were some forty bishops, a certain number of them diocesans of the Province of Canterbury. Anyone unfamiliar with English usage might have supposed that the Canterbury diocesans, or some representative members of their company, would have played a part in the Inthronization of their new Metropolitan. They were, however, merely passive accessories to what the B.B.C. announcer described (if I correctly remember his words) as "the magnificent pageant." Apart from the Archbishop himself, the principal actors in the ceremony were the Vicar-General of the Province, the Dean of the Cathedral Church and the Archdeacon of Canterbury. The Vicar-General read the Mandate for "induction, enthronement and installation." The Dean and the Archdeacon led the Archbishop to the places at which he was to be enseated; and the Archdeacon of Canterbury, "by virtue of the authority which I hold" (he said) first placed the Archbishop in the canopied seat in choir (wrongly designated in most guide books as "the Throne"), then the Dean installed the Archbishop in the decanal stall in quire, and finally the Archdeacon inthronized him in the ancient marble episcopal seat, known as "the chair of St Augustine," which on this occasion had been set at the top of the steps, west of the screen, so as to be in full sight of the great concourse gathered in the nave.

Majesty of setting, dignity of ceremony, beauty of music and singing—these may well have lulled in the beholders any question which less elaborate accompaniments might

[1] A paper read to a gathering at Oxford on May 5, 1942.

have provoked concerning the several parts of the Rite and concerning the personages who performed the essential acts. Why, for instance, it might be asked, should there have been three enseatings? Why, again, should the Archdeacon of Canterbury, and not one of the bishops of the Province, or at least the Dean of the Cathedral, have performed the act of Inthronization? What, in fact, is the origin and meaning of Inthronization? To this last question the lawyers, or some of them, have a ready answer. "Inthronement," a lawyer once explained to me, "is the bishop's equivalent of a clerk's induction into a benefice. Each ceremony is a formal assumption of *possessio*." "The difference between the ceremonies," he continued, "is merely this: Induction is seizin *per clavem*, whereas Inthronement is seizin *per cathedram*." "As you will perceive," he concluded, "it is not necessary for either of these acts to be embodied in a religious service. Strictly considered, the hymns, prayers and other devotional adjuncts now customary are irrelevant to occasions which are essentially secular." The parallel here drawn between Inthronization and Induction can claim support from the formula recited by the Archdeacon of Canterbury. In setting the Archbishop in the throne, the Archdeacon "inducted, inthroned and installed" him "into the real and actual corporal possession" of the archiepiscopal See of Canterbury, "with all its metropolitical rights, dignities, honours, privileges and appurtenances whatsoever." The formula might have been devised by the lawyer whose opinion I have quoted, so clearly is that opinion echoed in it. Both the formula and the legal theory, however, strike a distinctively medieval note; and if it be true that the ceremony of Inthronization is "as old as the church itself," or that it is at least pre-medieval in origin, we may discount the formula as not being necessarily a faithful commentary upon the act. At best, the Law is but a poor interpreter of the Rites of the church; and to discover the meaning, no less than the origin, of Inthronization, we shall do better to turn from Law to Liturgy.

The bishop's seat, his *θρόνος*, *sedes*, *sella* or *cathedra*, is the oldest of the ensigns of the bishop's dignity. The staff and ring appear in Spain in the time of St Isidore, but probably have no very long usage behind them. The mitre is a newfangled ornament of the eleventh century, and even now is not entirely restricted to bishops. Neither the pendant reliquary, of which the pectoral cross is a development,

nor the pectoral cross itself, are strictly to be classed as episcopal ornaments. They were originally objects of personal piety; bishops as a class did not affect the pectoral cross before the seventeenth century, and it was the sumptuous and *soignés* bishops of France who then made the ornament *à la mode*. The origin and development of clothing and ornament as marks of order within the ministry may be said to lie within the Middle Age, if the Pontificate of St Gregory the Great be taken as the dawn of that age. There was, it is true, one ill-judged experiment in episcopal dress made in the earlier period. Certain bishops of Gaul, so we learn from a letter of Pope Celestine I written in 428, had adopted the philosopher's pallium and a girdle, on the ground that this garb conformed with the injunction in *Luke* xii, 35. Such oddity, the Pope thinks, can be understood in persons who have not grown up in the Church, but are converts from some other rite. Then, turning to gentle raillery, he suggests that the Gallican bishops should complete their scriptural outfit by adopting the staff and the burning lamp. "We bishops," he concludes on a note which was struck on a famous occasion by the late Dr A. M. Fairbairn, "we bishops are to be distinguished from the laity and from others *doctrina, non veste; conversatione, non habitu; mentis puritate, non cultu.*"[1] In a word, ancient Christians recognized the bishop of a city, not by the clothing which he wore, but by the chair in which he sat in church.

The provision of a distinctive seat for the bishop was already an established practice by the third century. "For the presbyters," prescribes the *Didascalia Apostolorum* (cap. xii.) "let there be assigned a place in the eastern part of the house [*i.e.* the church]; and let the bishop's throne be set in the midst and let the presbyters sit with him."[2] No mention is made here of the altar; but the plan of the east end presupposed by the *Didascalia* is with little doubt that which appears in the great basilicas of the Constantinian and subsequent periods. The altar is set in the chord o the apse. The seats follow the curve of the wall behind the altar, the bishop's throne standing in the centre and the presbyters' benches extending to right and left. This plan became almost universal. The east ends of English cathedrals conformed with it until such time as a rectangular east wall and a screen behind the altar necessitated the

[1] Hurter, *Ep. Sel.*, p. 182. [2] Ed. Conolly, p. 119.

removal of the throne westward, and the replacing of it so as to face north or south, as preference might dictate. The new, the " Gothic," fashion almost entirely obliterated the old. At Canterbury, however, the marble " chair of St Augustine " was suffered to remain in its ancient position until the nineteenth century, though disconnected from the sanctuary by the altar screen. The discovery of the original throne between the two central piers of the apse at Norwich has been followed by its restoration to use; here, alone of all English cathedrals, can the bishop be seen occupying his ancient (in this connexion it may be permissible even to use the adjective " primitive ") place at the celebration of Divine Service.

Raised by a platform above the floor-level of the sanctuary spread with cushion and carpet of rich embroidery, and obscured from view by no thicket of candlesticks and crucifix, standing reliquaries, metal flowers and such like, the throne of the ancient basilica drew all eyes beyond the altar to itself, and to the bishop who sat upon it. The plan and furnishing of the basilican sanctuary are sometimes compared with those of Heaven as pictured in *Apocalypse* iv. That the basilican arrangement was consciously modelled upon that of the Apocalyptist's vision is improbable. That the similarity was not altogether unnoticed in antiquity, however, is suggested by the well-known mosaic in the church of Sta Pudenziana in Rome. This mosaic, which belongs to the fourth century and probably to the Pontificate of Siricius, suffered irreparable damage in the lamentable redecoration of the church effected in the sixteenth century, but enough has remained to indicate the magnificence of the original execution, and the theme which the picture was designed to present. The background of the picture is formed by the walls of the Ecclesia Pudentiana. The church has no roof, and rising above it can be seen the palaces of the Heavenly City, in the midst of which, set on a green hill, stands a giant cross, reaching into the blue of the sky. To right and left of the cross, gazing down from the sky, are the Four Beasts of *Apocalypse* iv. Below, filling the centre of the church, stands a throne, richly draped and decorated, whereon is represented the seated and majestic figure of our Lord. On either side of Him, *in circuitu sedis*, appear the figures of the Apostles, also seated. To Roman Christians of the fourth century who saw in its original splendour this mosaic of the former *ecclesia matrix*

of their city, the parallel between the scene depicted in the mosaic and the living scene in the sanctuary beneath was, and was doubtless designed to be, inescapable of notice. The bishop's throne is the counterpart of the Lord's. To those who know what the bishop's office and function are, his throne is the symbol of government and teaching.

This significance is expressed in the oldest extant Roman prayer for the consecration of a bishop. The prayer belongs to the fifth century; the substance of it may well be older. Towards the end of it comes the petition "*Tribuas ei cathedram episcopalem ad regendam ecclesiam tuam et plebem universam.*"[1] The MS which contains this consecration prayer of course lacks rubrics. We have to turn to other and later documents for the ceremonies, but it is possible to reconstruct the main features of the rite with fair certainty. The bishop-elect received his consecration in his own cathedral church in the presence of his clergy and laity. The consecrator recited over him the long consecration prayer, of which an extract has been quoted above, and which was accompanied by the imposition or extension of the consecrator's hand. The prayer over, the new bishop received the kiss of peace from the consecrator and other bishops present; and then he was set in his throne. The Inthronization was a mute ceremony: it was accompanied, that is to say, by no formula. No formula was indeed necessary. The act proclaimed to all who witnessed it that the consecration had been effected, and that the new bishop had assumed the government of his church. The Inthronization thus performed, Mass was then celebrated.

Roman rites and Roman ceremonies, the Roman liturgy in general, became the model (as everyone knows) for the Churches of Latin Christendom. Not that these Churches restricted themselves to the austere simplicity of ancient Roman usage. They did no such thing. If they adopted the old Roman pattern, they used it as a groundwork for embellishment. When we turn to the earliest English Pontificals (those known as "Egbert," *Lanaletense* and the "Benedictional of Abp Robert," all of them MSS of the tenth century), we find this procedure amply illustrated throughout, and not least in the Order for the Consecration of a Bishop. One of the enrichments of the latter is connected with the bishop's Inthronization. When the

[1] Feltoe, *Sacramentarium Leonianum*, p. 120.

new bishop is placed in his *cathedra episcopalis*, a prayer is to be said by one of the bishops present, usually (we may suppose) by the consecrator. Two prayers are provided, the second being a brief alternative to the first. Both prayers emphasize the likeness of the bishop to the apostles, and stress the bishop's teaching function. The prayer of Inthronization is followed by a benediction, recited (presumably again by the consecrator) over the bishop still sitting in his throne. The benediction, like the prayers preceding it, "comes from a quarter" (to borrow a phrase of Edmund Bishop) "that may conveniently be called Gallican," and exhibits the largeness of the Gallican type of liturgical compositions. Beginning with the petition, "*Populus te honoret*," it goes on to pray "*Ecclesia sit mater tua et altare: sit deus pater tuus: sint angeli amici tui: sint apostoli iratres tui*," and concludes "*Angeli recipiant te, et pax tecum fndiscrepabilis*."[1] Fanciful by comparison with sober Roman standards, this Gallican benediction yet has the merit of setting the newly inthronized bishop's mind "on things above, and not on things on the earth."

Whether or not practice always conformed with them, the rubrics of these English Pontificals presuppose that a bishop-elect will be consecrated in his own cathedral. The Metropolitan and the Provincial bishops present the new bishop to his diocese in person, and then depart, leaving him at its head. The propriety of the procedure is unquestionable; but it was soon disregarded. Rome again set the example. Unwilling to make the journey to Velletri or Sta Rufina or any other suburbicarian See, the Roman Pontiff summoned the bishop-elect to Rome, inquired into his election and suitability and examined him personally (thus originating the process of confirmation), and then, if he approved (or confirmed) the election, consecrated the elect in St John Lateran on the day following.[2] This procedure was imitated by Metropolitans. In England, consecrations were moved from the cathedrals of the *consecrandi* to the Metropolitical churches of Canterbury and York. How did this change affect the ceremony of the new bishop's Inthronization at the end of his consecration rite? The answer to this question is given in the rubric

[1] *Benedictional of Archbishop Robert*, Henry Bradshaw Society, 1902, p. 130.

[2] See *Ordo Romanus VIII* in Mabillon, *Musæum Italicum*, 1724, t. ii, p. 87 *f*.

of a Pontifical, now in the library of Magdalen College, and written between 1156 and 1200 for use in the Southern Province. The rite for the bishop's consecration omits the Inthronization; and the rubric provides for the new bishop to be inthronized in his cathedral "*ab aliquo episcopo, cui a metropolitano iniunctum fuerit.*"[1] The prayers to be recited are those already associated with the ceremony in the earlier Pontificals—viz., one or other of the two Inthronization prayers and the Gallican benediction "*Populus te honoret*," etc. There is, however, a new prayer preceding the act of Inthronization. This prayer consists of the opening clauses of the old Roman consecration of a bishop, together with the clause connecting the bishop's *cathedra* with the government of God's Church and people. The purpose of the prayer is clearly to exhibit the organic connexion between the bishop's Inthronization and his consecration. This connexion is further exhibited in the person of the inthronizator, who, being a bishop, is not merely a delegate of the metropolitan, but is also a representative of the episcopal order.

Here, then, we have our first "Order for the Inthronization of a Bishop." A contemporary Pontifical gives us likewise an Order for the Inthronization of an Archbishop at Canterbury. It is presupposed that the new archbishop will already have received his pall from Rome; and the rubrics direct the carrying of the pall in procession before the archbishop, who is to be vested with it before the Inthronization proper. The whole brief order is a new composition, stressing the "*fastigium sacerdotii*," the supreme dignity of the archiepiscopate.[2] The new archbishop is conducted to the pontifical throne, but no longer is he to be "put" (*mittatur*) into it. "He is to ascend the throne" (*cathedram ascendat*), and having done so, he seats himself. Nevertheless, tradition is not entirely ignored. The bishops still play a part. Not yet a monastic cantor, but a bishop, precents *Te Deum*. Another bishop conducts the archbishop to the throne. In 1193 a dispute arose between two bishops as to which of them should perform this office. The Bishop of London claimed the right, as being Dean of the Province. The Bishop of Rochester also claimed it, as being the archbishop's provincial chaplain. The monks of Christ Church likewise pretended a claim. It was

[1] *Pontifical of Magdalen College*, Henry Bradshaw Society, 1910, p. 77.
[2] Dublin MS, printed in *Pontifical of Magdalen College*, p. 249 *f*.

eventually settled that the Bishop of Rochester should support the archbishop at the putting on of the pall, and that the Bishop of London should stand on his right hand at the throne.[1]

One feature of this new Canterbury Rite deserves a passing notice, since its imprint appears in the order of April 23. When the procession with the pall reaches the quire, the archbishop places the vestment upon the altar, and is then conducted "*ad sedem suam*," where he remains while the monks kiss first the pall and then the archbishop himself. The archbishop, it will be remembered, was the formal head of the monastery of Christ Church. As such, he had a *sedes* in quire. The earlier Norman archbishops probably sat in the customary abbatial stall. When the latter came to be occupied by the prior, as being actual head of the convent, another seat in quire was provided for the archbishop. It is this seat to which the rubric refers; and the later Inthronization Orders designate it the archbishop's "*sedes lignea in choro*"[2] to distinguish it from the marble *cathedra pontificalis*. This *sedes lignea* is the ancestor of Archbishop Tenison's imposing wooden seat, erected in 1704, the greater part of which now stands in the south-east transept, and which in 1844 was replaced by Archbishop Howley's present unpleasing gothic structure in stone. The lofty altar-screen and canopy, set up in 1669, had totally obscured from view, and from relation with the sanctuary,[3] the marble *cathedra* which continued to stand eastward on the top of the steps, and so was now used only upon the rare occasions of Inthronization. When the solemn performance of Inthronization was revived in the nineteenth century, the *sedes in choro* was treated, unhistorically, as "the archiepiscopal throne," and the archbishop was mistakenly "inthronized" in it, as well as in the "marble chair." By 1821 the latter, in ignorance of its history and function, had been removed to "Becket's Crown," where, with a brief

[1] See Parker, *De antiquitate Britannicæ Ecclesiæ*, 1729, p. 225, and Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Rolls Series 73, i, p. 522.

[2] Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*, 1882, vol. ii, p. 312. The distinction survived the Reformation. Somna, in his *Antiquities of Canterbury*, 1640, pp. 169, 171, distinguishes between "the Archbishop's wooden seat or chair" on "the south side of the quire," and "the Archiepiscopall throne or marble chair" at the top of the steps behind the altar.

[3] See the engraving in J. Dart, *History and Antiquities of the Cathedral Church of Canterbury*, 1726, p. 31.

interval of sojourn in the south-east transept, it remained until the outbreak of war three years ago.

The further enseating in the Dean's stall, on April 23, appears to be an attempt (and, from the point of view of Canterbury history, an unnecessary attempt) to preserve the memory of the archbishop's ancient relation to the community of Christ Church. At Ely, the successors of the first abbot-bishop were formally installed as well as inthronized. At Canterbury the only ceremony introduced from the Rite of an Abbot's Installation was the kissing of the archbishop by the monks.

With the thirteenth century, the Rites of Inthronization begin to suffer the change which gives some ground for the legal interpretation of the ceremony as induction into the holding of property. For one thing, diocesan bishops tended to become more and more occupied with affairs of state, and their concern with business at Westminster made them unwilling, if not always unable, to attend the Inthronization of an addition to their number in some distant cathedral city. Hence arose the metropolitan's practice of deputing the Archdeacon of Canterbury to perform the act formerly performed by a bishop. Not infrequently the archdeacon was represented by a proxy, and in some cases the new bishop likewise. Another factor in the situation was the jealous sense of rights, property and privilege, by which the corporate bodies, institutions and corporations sole, constituting the medieval *Ecclesia Anglicana*, were possessed. Being already economically independent of their bishops, the medieval cathedral chapters, monastic as well as secular, lost no opportunity of enlarging and establishing their independence, and of acquiring rights and privileges against any person who in any way might threaten their independence. In their relation to bishops, the practice of translation put the chapters into a strong position. Translation increased rather than diminished the importance of Inthronization. A newly consecrated bishop had been consecrated to a particular see and to no other. In the case of a translated bishop, who required no second consecration for his new see, Inthronization was the only rite which presented him to the new see. Inthronization, therefore, became an essential element of the process of translation, and having regard to the spirit of the age, we can hardly be surprised to observe that Inthronization comes to be regarded as the occasion

on which the rights and other *temporalia* belonging to the see were formally assumed by the new bishop. The chapter, on the other hand, was owner of the church in which alone Inthronization could be performed. For all that he had been elected and confirmed, if the bishop were to be excluded by the chapter from the cathedral and from Inthronization, his situation would have been embarrassing. Rights which he claimed would have been questioned, and the assertion of them would have been cumbersome, costly and slow. Bishops and chapters, therefore, came to an arrangement, by which the bishop, before being admitted to the cathedral for Inthronization, took an oath of loyalty to his Church, swore to observe unimpaired its ancient and approved customs, and undertook faithfully and actively to maintain all the rights, liberties and dignities of his Church.[1] The chapter, having thus secured recognition of its own rights, then permitted the bishop, by means of Inthronization, to secure possession of his. To establish the matter beyond dispute, the old forms were jettisoned. Instead of them, the Archdeacon of Canterbury (or his proxy) recited a neat new formula, phrased in legal terminology, and declaring the bishop's induction into real and actual corporal possession. One Salisbury Inthronization Order, contained in a Pontifical of the fifteenth century, preserves a vestige of the past. If another bishop happened to be present at an Inthronization, he was to recite the old blessing, "*Populus te honoret*," etc. over the new bishop sitting in his throne.[2] A contemporary order, written for the Dean and Chapter, however, omits this provision. When the new bishop was inthronized in person, he proceeded at once to sing Mass. When he was represented by a proxy, Mass was sung by one of the cathedral officials. Here, again, the practice of the past is preserved.

At Canterbury, the monks were successful in asserting their claims. Though the archbishop continued to summon his comprovincials to his Inthronization, the latter were deprived of all participation in the Rite. The sole officiant was now the prior, "*ad quem pertinet*" (says the Canterbury rubrician) "*archiepiscopum inthronizare.*"[3] "Reverently taking him into his arms," the prior placed the Primate in the ancient marble throne, with words asserting the prior's

[1] *Cf.* Sarum Oath in C. Wordsworth, *Salisbury Processions and Ceremonies*, p. 105.

[2] Maskell, *op. cit.*, p. 307 *f.*

[3] Maskell, *op cit.*, p. 314 *f.*

competence so to do: "*In Dei nomine. Amen. Auctoritate eiusdem ego N. prior huius ecclesiæ Christi Cantuariæ inthronizo te dominum archiepiscopum in hac Cantuariæ ecclesia . . .*"[1] The legal phraseology was introduced subsequently. At York, the officiant was the Dean, and a legal formula was recited as at Canterbury and elsewhere.[2]

Though unquestionably in harmony with the thought of its time, the late medieval treatment of the Rite of Inthronization is regrettable. Forgetting the rationale of the ceremony and introducing a new and inappropriate legal element, it directed the minds of new bishops and new archbishops, not to things above, but to things on the earth.

King Henry VIII's Ecclesiastical Appointments Act of 1534 provided for the continuance of Inthronization or Installation, "as the case shall require." It might have been expected that, in 1559, when (as Sandys wrote to Henry Bullinger) Queen Elizabeth "*pro papistis bonos Christianos sibi assumpsit*,"[3] Inthronization would be discontinued, or that the old Rite would be modified. On the one hand, however, the situation at the outset of Elizabeth's reign recommended caution, and caution counselled a careful adherence to constitutional procedure; and on the other hand, Matthew Parker, the Queen's new archbishop, was by nature a precise man. He took care that arrangements should be made for his Inthronization at Canterbury, following upon his Consecration at Lambeth on December 17, 1559. The Queen's commissioners on December 31 issued a Mandate to the Archdeacon of Canterbury for the "induction, investiture, installation and Inthronization" of the new archbishop,[4] directing that he be placed in the archiepiscopal throne (*cathedra*) "*cum omni honore debito, adhibitis de more adhibendis.*" On January 1, 1560, the Archdeacon, Edmund Guest, appointed proxies to give effect to the Mandate,[5] and on the next day Parker instructed proxies to act on his behalf in the ceremony.[6] We may speculate on the reason for issuing the Mandate to the archdeacon, and not to the dean, who, as successor of the prior, might have been supposed to inherit the prior's right of Inthronization—whatever the explanation, the

[1] *Ibid.*
[2] See *York Pontifical*, Surtees Society, 1873, pp. 373 *ff.*
[3] *Zurich Letters*, 1st S., p. 3.
[4] *Register of Matthew Parker*, Canterbury and York Society, Part XI, p. 34.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 35.
[6] *Ibid.*

Mandate established a precedent, from which (as far as I know) there has been but one departure in three hundred and eighty years. From Parker's day until our own, Inthronization has been duly performed for all bishops and archbishops of the two English Provinces, frequently (in accordance with medieval and Tudor precedent) by proxies of both principals. Rendered into English, changed in some details, and with its movement usually obscured by a haze of hymns, the late medieval Rite of Inthronization continues among us still. For its survival, the lawyers, in their relentless quest for fees, may claim some part of the credit, but not all. It is one of the ironies of our history that *Ecclesia Anglicana*, when it believed itself to be adopting a primitive standard, was in fact grounding itself more firmly in the late medieval tradition. If it failed to reproduce the marks of the church of Chrysostom, Ambrose and Augustine, still less of that of Timothy, Titus and Paul, it was even less successful in removing the marks of the Church of Morton, Warham and Wolsey.

E. C. Ratcliff.

Diffused Christianity: Asset or Liability?

The following glance at the position of Christianity in Britain claims none of the accuracy of a scientific survey, but is merely the general impression gained by the writer from his experience in working-class parishes in London and Sheffield and in work amongst former university students. It is suggested that the picture is something like this. About one-quarter of the adults and rather more children are attached to a religious denomination. In some parts of the country church attendance is more common than in others; generally speaking, the proportion of practising Christians in the large cities is less than it is in the country and in the smaller towns. It is also true that the influence of the Church is greater in some of the old cathedral cities than it is in the modern industrial areas. We observe, furthermore, that in some parts of the country Nonconformity is much stronger than in others, and that, particularly in the "Celtic fringe," there is a strong Puritan tradition which still has a considerable influence on the social customs of the people.

It is obvious that, compared with the period 1880 to 1900, the number of churchgoing Christians of all denominations has greatly decreased. There are various reasons for this which we may note in passing. The higher criticism of the Bible, the comparative study of religions, and the discoveries of science have affected the beliefs of many educated people. The influence of this intellectual scepticism is now penetrating to the working classes. It seems clear that other changes have taken place at the same time. The attitude to Sunday has been markedly different since the last war. Continental travel and the effect of the several years which many men passed on the Continent during the war have left their mark. In addition, the facilities provided by the railways for Sunday travel and the other forms of amusement made available have led to a change in the popular attitude to Sunday which has seriously affected church attendance. We note, on the other hand, that the people who do go to church to-day have a real reason for going, and do not go for lack of an alternative or because it is respectable. It seems clear, moreover, that the period 1880-1900 was rather a freak period in church attendance on Sundays, and was not typical of previous centuries. The Victorian Sunday was a very different thing from Sunday in medieval England, which more closely resembled what we should now call a continental Sunday.

What is more disquieting than the drop in church attendance is the obvious indifference with which the Church is regarded by 75 per cent. of the population. Although, for example, many churches are open all day for prayer, the number who use them is extremely small. The great disservice that the Victorian Church did to the cause of Christian worship in England was to confine it almost exclusively to Sunday, so giving rise to the idea that to go to church on any other day was the prerogative of cranks and queers. For now that Sunday has largely become a day of pleasure, this means, in fact, that church attendance is becoming less regular and normal as the years go by. Although we are not primarily concerned in this paper with church attendance as such, it is obvious that the survival of organized religion is bound up with it. As Dr Mess says in his valuable little book, *Social Groups in Modern England*, the present position is unstable and organized religion must either revive or decay still further. "It is

surely desirable," he says, " that men should make up their minds and act accordingly. The reader may well ask himself what he wishes to see. Does he want this to be a Christian country? Or would he like to see some other religion prevalent? Or would he like to see religion disappear from it?"

I believe that a large proportion of thinking Englishmen of all classes would answer yes to the first question and no to the others, but they would have a prior question to ask. They would want to know whether the survival of England as a Christian country depended upon the survival of organized religion, and on this point they would find themselves unconvinced. In increasing numbers they are coming to think that the claim to be a Christian does not rest upon membership of an organized religious denomination. They are members of the vast body of " diffused Christians," and it is with them that we are to concern ourselves. We are faced at once by a difficulty: there are two Englands, and what we say of one is not necessarily true of the other. We shall have to consider separately the educated, middle-class " diffused Christian " and his brother Englishman, unknown to him, of the working class.

Since the time of Arnold, the middle-class Englishman has been trained at school and college in the Christian-Humanist values. He has learnt from the sermons in his school chapel and in the general atmosphere of its community that he must shoulder the responsibilities of government as well as accept the privileges of a ruling class. The conception of the English gentleman is a product of classical humanism and liberal Christianity. Its essence is a code of behaviour, an ethical system and not a religious faith. In general, the *beliefs* of the public school are much nearer to " blood and soil " than to the creeds of Christendom, but so adapted (unconsciously, of course) as to meet the needs of a world-wide Empire where the governed are of different race from the rulers. At its best, this religion has produced a highly-civilized, cultured, strong personality with a well-developed " social sentiment." At its worst, it has produced an unbearable prig and unimaginative bore, but still a conscientious one.

Formerly, the ruling class attached considerable importance to organized religion as a social force which made for stability and decent behaviour. After the Napoleonic

wars, for example, a million pounds was voted for church building, and a real concern was felt because of the widespread misery and paganism of the industrial proletariat. No one would dispute the fact that the social conscience of the ruling class was, in the case of many individuals, the result of a living faith in God. We have only to mention Wilberforce, Shaftesbury, the Clapham Sect, to see this. At the same time, the fear of revolution and social upheaval brought them many supporters, and these have always been in a majority. There are still many to-day who support the Church financially for this reason, and not out of any conviction about her divine mission.

The diffused Christianity of the ruling class is not without its effect in many departments of our social life. Without it there could hardly be an Established Church or bishops sitting in the House of Lords. It influences our state educational system and the administration of justice. It is the religion of many of our judges, executive and civil service chiefs, and of high officers in the services. It ensures that Christian opinion will receive, at any rate, a courteous hearing in the affairs of state. It means, in general, that this country may in some sense be called Christian, and that up to now no rival philosophy has been accepted as the basis of our national life. It seems, too, that there is a widely-accepted ethos to which the Christian can appeal, something on which more can be built. The diffused Christian of the educated classes is almost proud of his ignorance of theology. His religion is one of works: he believes in giving the other fellow a helping hand; he is, or tries to be, a good neighbour. He is friendly to the Church and admires the work of many of the clergy, but he has little patience with doctrine or dogma. The practice of Christianity seems to him to be a straightforward business, and the Church seems to exist largely to make straight ways crooked and light places dark. This is largely a defence mechanism. He is afraid of the consequences of taking Christianity too seriously; it may cause unbearable tensions in his life and end up by turning him into a pacifist or a socialist!

The diffused Christianity of the working classes comes to them much more directly from the ministrations of the parish church and the mission hall. A large proportion of working-class people have been members of Sunday schools and youth organizations. Their homes often have a copy of the parish magazine or one of the more popular religious

weeklies on the kitchen dresser. There are innumerable meetings of various kinds held by the churches in working-class areas, mainly attended by women, which diffuse Christianity around the neighbouring streets. In many elementary schools a good grounding is given in Biblical knowledge, but there is no evidence that it survives beyond the school-leaving age. Many working-class parents value the contact which their children have with the Church. They like their children to have a right start in life, but they take it for granted that church and school will be left at the same time, and they consider it rather odd if their children turn out to be religious. On the whole, working people respect the clergy and feel that they are their ministers. They expect them to serve them, and they do not consider that they are under any obligation to go to church in return for services rendered. *Men* are often inclined to take the line that attendance at church would create an impossible situation in their lives, since they would be quite unable in their work to live up to their profession. This is a healthy attitude when genuine, and it may be one of the reasons why more women than men attend church. There is naturally much more superstition among the uneducated classes, and there is a considerable survival of religious practices even though the original significance of the practice is lost. In particular, very many working people say their prayers at night, and almost all working women come to be churched and to have their babies christened. There seems no doubt that the significance of churching and baptism is social rather than religious, and is an illustration of the social function of religion. Many people will not allow a woman into their homes after childbirth until she has been churched—a clear survival of a primitive social taboo. Baptism, too, is a social event when the child receives its name, and it is often thought of as compulsory and in the same category as registration. There is much more "folk" religion than we sometimes think. Apart from spiritualism, which is very common, there are a great number of little groups which meet in front parlours for some kind of witness or singing meeting. A survey in Newcastle some years ago revealed the existence of many such groups in the east end of the city.

Apart from this common, if vague, belief in God, the diffused Christianity of the workers again shows itself as a moral code. Unlike that of the ruling class, with its insist-

ence upon service, that of the workers is mainly concerned with personal abstention from drink, bad language, gambling and sexual vice. The "diffused Christian" usually informs you that he is as good as his acquaintance who goes to church. *His* church is usually his Friendly Society, his trade union branch, or his political party. There he meets his brothers or comrades in the common enterprise of mutual self-help. Like his brother in the middle class, he believes in *practical* Christianity and will often quote from the Sermon on the Mount to show that in this matter he is on the side of the Master and the Samaritan, whereas the Church is too often "priestly and levitical."

There is no doubt that the average working man looks upon the Church as a club for the good people. He will not join because he thinks he will fail to "live up to it," and he expects (and rightly) a higher standard of goodness from those of his mates who are known to attend church. He has his own ideas, too, about the function of the Church in society. It should be on the side of the common man and against war. He cannot clearly understand why all Christians are not pacifists, and he is terribly indignant about what he imagines to be the goings-on of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. He is more aware than we sometimes think of the financial side of the Church's life, and wonders how churchmen can presume to criticize inequalities of wealth until they do something to distribute their own money more equitably.

There is widespread evidence of the influence of diffused Christianity in English social institutions. It is to be seen in the press, broadcasting, the cinema, literature, and to some extent in industry and commerce. There has also been an historic connexion in England between the Christian religion and the extension of political democracy. Since democratic government rests in theory upon the assumption of responsibility by every voter, and since Christianity enables a man to become a responsible person, it is not surprising that the extension of the franchise has often followed a religious revival which was directed primarily to the unfranchised section of the community. (*E.g.*, Methodism preceded the Reform Act of 1832 and the evangelization of the town proletariat by the Salvation Army preceded the Reform Acts of the early years of this century, which culminated in universal male adult franchise before the last war.)

Mr Middleton Murry, in his *Price of Leadership*, has the following passage: "'Democracy,' said Plato, who knew not Christianity, 'leads to tyranny,' and Christianity can alone save democracy from this nemesis because democracy, unless it is constantly revivified by the regeneration of its individual members by Christian education into citizenship of a Christian society, must degenerate into totalitarianism. The choice before democracy is simple: either the individual must learn to conquer the lower self and educate his true personality as a citizen of a Christian society or the democratic state, abandoned to be the instrument of the lower selves of its members, will enforce upon them a uniformity which is destructive of the whole personality. The modern industrial democratic society, by reason of its economic complexity, cannot suffer itself to become anarchical. If it is not permitted to develop creatively into a Christian society it must become a totalitarian tyranny." In other places the same writer (and others) have argued that the survival of democracy in England up to now has been due to the diffused Christianity which has come to us as a legacy from the past. Its continuance will likewise depend, as Mr Murry says here, on the willingness of the English people to become a more consciously Christian society.

So much for the facts as we see them. Now, is this diffused Christianity—ethics divorced from dogma—liability or asset? We have already said that it has no survival value and that it represents an unstable condition of society. Both Dr Mess and Mr Murry agree that this is so, as do many other writers. In the life of three generations we see a definite regression. The generation of our grandfathers accepted the Christian faith and practised the Christian ethic. The generation of our fathers discarded the faith but still lived by the ethic. Our generation is seriously questioning the ethic. In a sense, therefore, whether we think diffused Christianity to be an asset or a liability to the propagation of the Christian faith, we have to act on our belief *now*. It may be that in a shorter time than we think there will no longer be a diffused Christian population largely indifferent but not consciously antagonistic to the Christian Church, but a population which has already found that a vague ethic gives no purpose to life and which has embraced a new religion demanding its entire allegiance. In that situation the technique of evangelism will have to

be worked out afresh. In the meantime we must accept the facts of the present position and assume that it will be sufficiently permanent to make it worth while discussing our attitude towards it. For the sake of clarity we shall describe two entirely opposite points of view.

Those who look upon diffused Christianity as a liability argue thus. Since most Englishmen think themselves Christians because they give a cup of cold water to a stranger, they are in a sense spiritually inoculated. The more they do in the way of social service, A.R.P., etc., the more self-satisfied they become and the further are they from that sense of need and dependence upon God which only comes as a result of conviction of sin. They are amongst those who think themselves better than others and are spiritually in the direct tradition of the Pharisees.

Furthermore, this kind of "love your neighbour" religion, when divorced from faith in God, is gravely in danger of becoming a "folk religion" which may call itself "positive Christianity" and institute schemes of winter help. Such a "British Christian" movement might become an exact counterpart to the German Christian movement which has been able to find so much good in National Socialism and which has completely failed to diagnose the true nature of that movement because it lacked the necessary Christian insights to do so.

Diffused Christianity is a liability because it confuses the real issue. It thinks that the initiative rests with man and not with God, and it knows nothing of the Christian doctrine of vocation: "You have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you." It cannot bring itself to say, "Having done all, we are unprofitable servants."

Those who take this view will draw as sharp a distinction as possible between its tenets and those of the Christian faith and life. The Church, for example, would confine her activities to preaching the Gospel and deepening the life and fellowship of her members, so that they would be quite clear as to the nature of allegiance to Christ and His Church. They, in turn, would make clear to their fellows outside the Churches the nature of the choice before them. It would be an uncompromising approach. "If the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it: but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you. And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet." The

Gospel is not to be tampered with; it can only be accepted or rejected in its entirety.

Christians who take this view will not look for spectacular results. Not many will crowd round the narrow gate that leads to life; many will be called but few chosen. It is not a frantic policy to "preserve Christian civilization," to use current jargon, but rather a recognition that God works in history through a remnant of freely-offered men and women who are in the world but not of it.

In their attitude to the occasional offices of the Church, Christians in this camp will take the view that Christian baptism, Christian marriage and Christian burial are for Christians and not for pagans. They will not be satisfied with "explaining" these services to those who ask for them, but will want to be assured that the explanation has led to an acceptance of the Christian faith. I think that, without doubt, they have the New Testament on their side here. Baptism was the very sign of repentance and conversion, and Christian marriage and burial were clearly intended for Christians.

Those who consider diffused Christianity an asset take a somewhat different view of the function of the Church in relation to the community. They believe that "he who is not against us is on our side," and that a community which has not repudiated Christianity, but which, on the contrary, shows in its life some of the marks of Christian living, is evidence of the leaven working in the world. Their conception of the Church as a human institution leads them to gloss over the differences between Church and State, since they think of them both as man-made, and are not clear, therefore, at what point the Church must resist the claims of the State, and for what reasons. For such people, membership of the Church is an optional extra. What they really think of first importance is that a man should be a good citizen, a good parent and a "good fellow." He may like Church services or he may not; it doesn't much matter either way.

Since this point of view considers religion to be primarily a social phenomenon, it will attach social significance to baptism, marriage and burial. The person who desires these ministrations will be expressing his solidarity with the other members of his society. Baptism will be the naming ceremony of the child, marriage the public avowal of the intention of lifelong union, and burial the society's last

farewell to one of its members. These will have value in themselves apart from any Christian significance, but since Christianity and not (say) Buddhism is the religion of the country, it is right and natural that these social rites should be performed by the Christian Church. In any case, that is presumably why an Established Church exists and what it is for. Establishment brings with it many privileges, but from some points of view serious hindrances. It is not honest to accept the one and to try to escape the other.

If this really be the situation, it may help us to see the task of evangelism a little clearer. The first necessity on the part of those of us who are called to be ministers of the word and the sacraments is to be clear that we are dealing with two distinct groups of people, both of whom claim the name of Christian. We must bring the pious believer face to face with the claims of society. We must bring the earnest "cup of cold water" Christian face to face with the claims of a transcendent God. No longer can we go on thinking that all Englishmen (or Anglicans) are Christians merely because there is a lot of good will amongst us. There is a real danger in times like these that the Churches will try to "cash in" on the rising emotional temper of the nation and think that by organizing special services for the many community groups that have come into existence they are "Christianizing" the nation. The value of such services is that they give an opportunity of presenting to these groups the insights of the Gospel, bringing them to a deeper knowledge of the effects of human sin and a sense of dependence upon God. Too often we are satisfied to praise them for the services they are rendering and to suggest that, although they do not know it, they are Christians after all. This is to confuse Christianity with "folk" religion and to pave the way for a godless humanitarianism such as has emerged in some continental countries. The same danger is to be seen in the attitude of some Christians to the problem of religious instruction in State schools. The answer to this is not for the Churches to agree on a kind of least common denominator of religious instruction or to expect that the State will do the Church's job by converting the children to the Christian faith.

The standing temptation of Anglicanism is to make the best of both worlds under the impression that it is holding the tension between them. Has not the time come when we must make our stand? "Progress always consists in

taking one or other of two alternatives, in abandoning the attempt to combine them. The pioneers of progress have therefore always to reckon with the law of mental inertia which manifests itself in the majority, who always go on believing that it is possible to combine that which can no longer be combined, and in fact claim it as a special merit that they, in contrast with the 'one-sided' writers, can do justice to the other side of the question" (A. Schweitzer, *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 237). Can we any longer combine under the Christian name those who believe in the revelation of God as given to us in the Bible and the Creeds, and those who believe in their own natural goodness as sufficient to meet the needs of this world and (if they believe it exists) the next?

JOHN DREWETT.

"The prime need of religion to-day is a theology. No religion can survive which does not know where it is. And current religion does not know where it is, and it hates to be made to ask."—P. T. Forsyth, *The Cruciality of the Cross*[2] (1910), p. 47.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

The Rev. E. C. Ratcliff is a Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford.

The Rev. John Drewett is Vicar of St John's Church, Park, Sheffield.

The Rev. R. Gregor Smith is Minister of the Lawson Memorial Church of Scotland at Selkirk.

Mr Bethell is Assistant Lecturer in English Language and Literature in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire.

The Rev. E. L. Mascall, O.G.S., is Sub-Warden of Bishop's Hostel, Lincoln.

Mr Mackinnon is a Fellow of Keble College, Oxford.

The Rev. J. W. Parker is Rector of Woodton, Bungay.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.—Matt. v, 48.

This text is a summary of the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount; but though a proper understanding of it raises vast problems about the nature of the Christian ethic, its relation to natural goodness, to faith, and to grace, this note proposes to give at most only the line of approach to these problems.

The future of the verb translated in the R.V. by " ye shall be " is not able to bear more than an imperative sense. Even Torrey has " be ye." It is also clear from the context that we are not dealing with a purely future state, as though Jesus had said, " one day you will be like God, namely, perfect." The sentence is weighted with command. In the parallel passage in Luke (Luke vi, 36) there is a simple imperative.

The crucial word is *perfect*. Our modern use of the word " perfect " is closely associated with ideas of moral betterment and development. The *Weltanschauung* of evolutionism and the notion of perfectibility dominate the general climate of thought. Perfect is vaguely understood as the last state in a progression. It is possibly because Luke perceived such a possible connotation in τελεῖος that he replaced it with οἰκτίρμενος : be *merciful*.

The word is not new to Hebrew thought. In the LXX it is frequent, and usually as a translation of תמים. Three typical usages are: (1) Deut. xviii, 13, *Thou shalt be perfect with the Lord thy God ;* (2) 1 Kings viii, 61, *Let your heart therefore be perfect with the Lord our God, to walk in His statutes ;* and (3) 1 Kings xi, 4, *And*

Solomon's heart was not perfect with the Lord his God. In these passages תמים is used as an expression of the cult, and means "whole" or "sound" or "unblemished," like the sacrificial offering. To be "perfect" means, therefore, to be whole or sound or true; and to be perfect as the Heavenly Father is perfect can then only mean to be wholly turned, with the whole will and being, to God, as He is turned to us.

The command of Jesus is, therefore, within a religious and not simply an ethical situation. Thurneysen sees this clearly enough; but he enervates the religious situation by asserting that as only Jesus is wholly turned to God His command must mean we should turn to *Himself*.[1] But we already have faith in Jesus when we hear this command, and it is in the context of His revelation of the Heavenly Father that we are commanded to make this response. It is a response of obedience, and effort, *in faith*. It is the call to purify our heart, and to will one thing, as Kierkegaard has so insistently stated.

The text, therefore, cannot bear the interpretation of "imitation" of Jesus. There is no reference in the context to the life of Jesus, its actual conditions, methods, plans, or achievements. We are not presented with a technique for living. Moral perfection, the ability to do the right in any given situation, in an absolute way, is a notion foreign to the thought of Jesus.

Nor can the text be used to support the idea of a new code of ethics, with an independent standard of good to which, apart from the religious situation in which it originated, we have to approximate. This is the commonest understanding of the text, but the humanist outlook in which it thrives is more than discredited to-day by the absence even of such approximations to the good.

Neither the legalist interpretation of Thurneysen, nor the pietist vagueness, nor the humanist-liberal optimism, can lead to anything but despair. But this may be the starting-point for faith. Then it may be seen that, when the Son is accepted as Saviour, we are not thereafter released on some shadowy moral way. But God demands, and keeps on demanding, absolute obedience from us. That the singleness of heart and mind and will—the existential unity of purpose—with which we turn to God is continually broken by sin, does not invalidate the command for faith. Faith is strengthened, rather, in its continual struggle to be worthy of grace. When this struggle is maintained within the realm of grace, with the work of Christ always present—that is, with the Heavenly Father always wholly turned to us—there can be no question of such an effort being accused of pelagianism, for its motive and inspiration are gratitude for Christ's revelation.

[1] In the pamphlet *Die Bergpredigt* (Theologische Existenz Heute, Nr. 46), pp. 27-28.

On this view, then, the absolute demand of God and the absolute response of the individual provide the starting-point, and the way, within faith, of moral effort. The test might, therefore, be paraphrased as follows: "Be wholly and unreservedly turned to God in all your strivings, in faith, just as, and because, He is wholly turned in love to you."

RONALD GREGOR SMITH.

RELIGION IN THE ROYAL NAVY

OF all our national institutions, there is perhaps none more truly steeped in tradition than the Royal Navy. Behind the customs and jargon of its community life lies a civilization of its own, evolved out of its own conditions of life by itself and for itself, and the ethos of which is by no means readily to be fathomed by a newcomer.

Chaplains and surgeons must speak with diffidence of a tradition which is theirs only by adoption; they already have the traditions of their own vocations, and their first duty to the Navy is loyally to live by them. The tradition which they have come to share has been built up and handed on by seamen, and on seamen it continues to depend. Its backbone to-day are those who have been bred in its ways since the age of fourteen, when, under hand-picked officers and instructors, they began their training as cadets at Dartmouth or seamen boys at one of the establishments such as Shotley.

Originating in the remoteness and peculiarity of the circumstances in which seamen have their being, the ethos of the Navy is more easily caught than taught, and is certainly less difficult to perceive than to define, for it begins with the spiritual. Its first principle, impressed upon a new entry in all manner of ways, is that self-seeking and the Service do not mix; and the fact that at all training establishments religious instruction by the chaplains is an appointed part of the course would not be confused by anyone knowing the Navy with a presumptuous use of Christianity to subserve other ends. In short, there is conserved in the heart of the Navy's tradition an element of Christianity which, whether appreciated as such or not, continues to have a profound influence on the characters of every generation of those who serve there. The famous phrase in the preamble to the Articles of War—"the Navy, whereon, under the good Providence of God, the wealth, safety and strength of the Kingdom chiefly depend . . ."—does, in fact, reflect the attitude of seamen. For them God is *there*. They may serve Him poorly and would readily admit it; but to say the least, as an officer recently wrote: "I do not believe that any man who serves the sea can be an atheist; such men are too conscious of a greater

Power for them to hold those views." *These men see the works of the Lord : and his wonders in the deep.*

From this inchoate mysticism to positive Christianity is a long stride, but there is everything in the Navy's tradition and customs to give the chaplain material with which to build the bridge. He will make little headway by trying to impose the conventions of churchmanship from without, but a wonderful creative task awaits the priest who will devote himself to building up into Christ the *anima naturaliter Christiana* already to be found there.

For he comes to a Service where the true humility of leaving oneself out of count is already considered the crown of all virtues, and in whose tolerant social code contempt is reserved for insincerity, self-seeking and injustice. He finds that this ideal of consideration for others, described as mutual respect, is even the basis of its discipline; that the standard for its officers has been set by generations trained from boyhood in the realization that " the Service " means service, and leadership the winning of men's loyalty—that theirs is a vocation demanding qualities deeper than technical competence and the ability to give orders. And he will find the spirit of this discipline typified *inter alia* by the unsparing time and effort that a good officer (which applies to most) will devote in the capacity of guide, philosopher and friend to the individuals of his division. As he learns to take his place in this background, the chaplain will find everywhere respect for his office and practical helpfulness. It is not unfair to say that the ripening of this inherent politeness into friendship and acceptance of his spiritual leadership can be prevented only by himself.

These elements of Christianity implicit in the Navy's tradition become unashamedly explicit in its statutes. It betokens at least an encouraging sense of values that the *first* of the Articles of War should be an injunction to commanding officers to " cause the public worship of Almighty God according to the liturgy of the Church of England . . . to be solemnly, orderly and reverently performed in their respective ships," and to " take care that prayers and preaching, by the chaplains in Holy Orders of the respective ships, be performed diligently, and that the Lord's day be observed. . . ." *King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions* go into more detail, requiring a celebration of the Holy Eucharist at least every Sunday and safeguarding the chaplain's rights as a priest in his daily duties. The most recent official pronouncement, issued as an Admiralty Fleet Order in 1940, runs:

In the conviction that the present war is a struggle between good and evil, and that in the practice of the Christian Religion may be found to-day the same support experienced by our forefathers in establishing in the Royal Navy those ideals of service and sacrifice which we have inherited—

Their Lordships, whilst appreciating that under conditions of war the instructions regarding Sunday work can seldom be realized, wish to emphasize the need for observing the instructions for the holding of Divine Service and Prayers.

They further direct that in battleships and cruisers all possible steps should be taken to provide a space set apart for the worship of God.

It is tempting, but not within the scope of this note, to try to give some sort of picture of all this in practice—of the Sunday Eucharist in a small ship, where the priest has set up his altar in whatever quiet spot he can arrange in its crowded spaces, and of the sacrifices cheerfully made in order to attend it; of the daily service at divisions in cruisers and big ships, with the R.M. band to lead the singing—only routine to many, perhaps, but none the less an opportunity; and of the simple courage and swift, direct approach of these men whose spiritual lives are so completely dependent on the use of their own inner resources.

The layman who has taken for granted the atmosphere of a parish offering him every spiritual aid and incentive may and does find the Navy difficult; and the writer has more than once been left with the impression that for some people seven sacraments are apparently not enough. So, too, the priest may take some time to settle down in his new surroundings. Coming from the comparative liberty of home life and the spaciousness of church, study and parish hall, he may not find it at all easy to adapt himself to a minute cabin in a ship which may not even have room for a chapel, and where the lives of his people are caught up in a busy routine in which he can find no place. He is called now, like his Master, to exercise his ministry on other men's ground. But neither he nor the faithful communicant layman will ultimately be other than thankful for the new sense of values that the day of spiritual loneliness by the grey sky and the bitter sea will have taught them—the abiding joy of sharing in and building up the Church not made with hands.

CHAPLAIN, R.N.

AND THE WORD WAS GOD

I.

ONLY-BEGOTTEN holy Word,
In Thy true substance still unheard,
We cannot, for Thy blinding light,
Spell Thee or read Thy sense aright.

Yet even in Nature's palimpsest,
With the Fiend's letter large impressed,
From time to time a prayerful breath
Reveals God's minuscule beneath.

The lion roaring for his prey
Sings praises in an uncouth way,
Though, following the Devil's word,
He falls upon the frightened herd.

The lamb skips in his innocence
And lives within the present tense,
But the old ram with baleful eye
Glares on the world suspiciously.

The rose's " aromatic soul "
Is stifled in a crystal bowl:
An instrument of Heaven's wrath
Sweeps up its petals from the cloth.

Even the stones that make the house
Protest against their own misuse:
The Spirit's deep unuttered groans
Make silent fissures in the stones.

Thus stone and water, beast and bird,
Bear tokens of the ancient Word,
Recall within their obscure strife
A legend of undying life.

O silent Voice beneath the ocean's roar,
Beyond the booming caverns of the shore,
Thou lurkest at the waterfall's still foot,
Seeping and creeping in the rowan's twisted root.

The Word within the icicle
Is frozen but infallible;
The Word which Heaven's children sing
To welcome each successive spring,
When green sap whispers to the leaf
A strictly orthodox belief
That grows and flowers with summer heat
(The vegetables' Paraclete)
Till every falling autumn seed
Affirms the Athanasian Creed:
From birth to death, then resurrection,
Life in a new and strange perfection.

O silent Voice within the ordered year,
O faint calligraphy of sun and flower,
Grant us the silent Voice within to hear,
To grow and blossom for the unknown, foreknown hour.

2.

That Word beyond our grasp, ineffable,
In Nature's law hinted by syllables,
Now compacted, translated into our tongue,
Is spoken at census-time in Bethlehem.

The ebb and flow of ocean-flood
That falls and rises in the blood,
The half-erasèd imprint of
An innocently cloven hoof,
The fire before a black-mouthed cave,
The flint and bone, the barrow-grave,
The demi-gods of earth and sky
Where truth lies hidden in a lie—
Obscure perception of a goal,
Which adumbrates the patterned whole;
That Voice that spake among the leaves
Judgment on Adam's sin and Eve's,
Yet on the mountain spake more mild
And bade a father spare his child;
All of the Promise and the Law
And what the Prophets knew and saw
Of blossoming deserts, living bones,
And of a mystery that atones;
All now is clear, the eternal plan
Of man made God by God-made-man.

A stable holds the universe,
Where God lies on His manger-bed,
And angels' wings and asses' ears
Flicker above his head.

The Maid He made has swaddled Him
Who was before the world began;
His daughter and his Mother she,
As He is God and Man.

Wise men come from far to see
This miniature Eternity,
And simple shepherds leave their flocks,
To marvel at the paradox.

O Word-made-flesh, Thou left'st not Heaven,
But bore Heaven with Thee down to earth;
Grant us Thy grace, our sins forgiven,
To grow and prosper in the second birth.

3.

Thou, holy Word, dost condescend,
In the pursuance of Thine end,
To consecrate peculiar means—
Bishops and priests, and even deans.

Thou workest marvels every day
By these strange lumps of common clay,
Who severally represent
Our multiverse Establishment.

The bright new curate's so at ease,
He prattles at parochial teas;
And yet, despite a swollen head,
Blesses aright the Holy Bread.

Our cautious Vicar who condones
That odd affair of Mrs. Jones,
Still when the hour of death is come
Can give the soul's Viaticum.

A Latitudinarian
And absentee diocesan,
Skilled in the ways of simony
And wholly eighteenth century;
A bishop of Victoria's days,
Concerned with crumpets and Greek plays,
Or with the latest popish plot
By vestments and the incense-pot
To lead our Church to its destruction
(Subtle Transmontane seduction);
Even a contemporary
Apostolic secretary,
With forms of pink and blue and green—
The bane of every rural dean—
May, by a miracle of touch,
And a " Defend, Lord, such-and-such,"
Transmogrify the veriest clod
Till he can walk and talk with God.

4.

Word that lay within the wheat
In secret, hidden, hard retreat,
That in the vineyard's luscious load
Quickened and flushed and darkly glowed,
Thou by the wine-press and the fire
Art born anew to man's desire,
Supplying by Thine own design
The double gift of Bread and Wine.

Thy double gift we offer Thee
And graft upon the saving Tree,
Whose bitter sap can yet transmute
To heavenly food this earthly fruit:
Angels and saints draw near to prove
The cosmic alchemy of love,
As in the Bread and Wine afresh
The Word becomes the Word-made-flesh.

Upon a tawdry altar placed
By careless priest in too much haste,
Received by casual hands at eight,
Forgotten if the breakfast's late:
O God, one moment's half-belief
Do Thou accept, and in that brief
Betrayal in the bended knee,
Save us from self-sufficiency !

5.

Word dwelling in creative fire,
At last the world's great funeral pyre,
When angels sent through every coast
Together sound Reveille and Last Post;

Thou didst in flesh Thy glory hide
To make flesh glorious as Thy Bride,
And shalt as Bridegroom choose Thine own,
Clothing anew the whitened bone.

Lord, in that day when some shall rise
Still with sea-water in their eyes,
And some shall shake the gathered mould
From aureoled hair of new-spun gold,
And some in business occupied
Have still the pen in hand or spade at side;

When conflagration of the earth
Scarce warms the limbs to second birth,
And prospect of a second death,
Despite the fire, brings chattering teeth,
Lord, reigning from the clouds of heaven,
Show in Thy hands and side our sins forgiven.

LITANY

By Thy life in cold and heat,
By Thy life in grape and wheat,
Miserere Domine.

By Thy birth of Mary blest,
'Mid the oxen laid to rest,
Miserere Domine.

Thou that with Thy Church art one,
Light and Life and Corner-stone,
Miserere Domine.

By Thy secret life divine
Under form of Bread and Wine,
Miserere Domine.

In the day when Thou shalt come
To lead Thy chosen people home,
Miserere Domine. Amen.

S. L. Bethell.

NATURE, GRACE AND MYSTICISM

Within the last few years the two distinguished Protestant theologians Dr Brunner and Dr Niebuhr have both vigorously criticized the traditional Catholic doctrine concerning the relation of nature and supernature in man.[1] This doctrine, which is based upon St Irenæus' exegesis of Gen. i, 26 (though, of course, no one maintains that it necessarily expresses the original meaning of the Hebrew text), distinguishes between the divine image (εἰκών, *imago*) in man, which it alleges to be indestructible, and the divine likeness (ὁμοίωσις, *similitudo*), which, it asserts, was lost through the Fall, though it can be progressively restored by grace in those who are regenerate. Furthermore, it equates the image with man's natural endowments, and the likeness with a *donum superadditum*, which is supernatural both *quoad modum* and *quoad essentiam*, and which exceeds anything that man's nature can either demand or obtain for itself. The strictures of Brunner and Niebuhr are the more important since neither of them is extreme in his view of human corruption. Brunner explicitly repudiates the Lutheran teaching that the image of God in man is completely wrecked, so that nothing but a " relic " of it remains, and he even more decisively rejects Barth's view, which apparently denies the survival of even a relic. Niebuhr, again, is prepared to accept the distinction between image and likeness as representing respectively " man's character as a creature embedded in the natural order " and " the freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally his self-transcendence," and he

[1] Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, chap. v (*c*) and Appendix I. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. i, chap. x.

considers that " Protestantism . . . was wrong in asserting that man's essential nature had been destroyed." Where, however, both of them disagree with the Catholic doctrine is in their assertion that it introduces into man an unnatural dualism, which sees man's highest activities as merely an accidental and, as it were, superfluous addition to a nature which could perfectly well find its fulfilment in the things of this world; and that, moreover, it belittles the evil of sin by affirming that the Fall leaves man's nature essentially unimpaired. Both of them maintain that man's spiritual endowments are rooted in his very nature, and they consider the effect of sin to be neither the loss of the " likeness," as in Catholic doctrine, nor the destruction of the " image," as in Lutheran and Barthian doctrine, but rather the perversion and distortion of the image.

Now it may be admitted that Catholic theologians have sometimes written as if man's supernatural endowments had no organic relation to his nature and as if the Fall merely caused him to lose something superfluous which he could in any case have quite well done without. But at its best the Catholic tradition has held no such view. St Thomas Aquinas, for instance, insists that fallen man is not only *spoliatus gratuitis*, but also *vulneratus in naturalibus*.[1] The point is, of course, that to lose something which you once possessed is not the same as never to have possessed it—in this sense, it is far *worse* to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all—even while it is also true that man, when restored by grace, can be raised above his unfallen condition (*O felix culpa!* " Greater good because of evil, larger mercy through the Fall ").

There is doubtless room for a far fuller investigation than has yet been made of the implications of the doctrine that man has by nature only a *potentia obedientialis*, a purely passive capacity, for receiving grace. It does not, we must remark, mean that, in the concrete, there has ever existed a purely and merely natural man. What it does mean is that, if we define man as a " rational animal," God might perfectly well have created man on the level of pure nature, and that a purely natural existence is all that the possession of rationality in itself necessarily demands. If we consider successively the various levels of material beings—lifeless matter, vegetable life, animal life, rational life—it is clear that the appearance on earth of a rational being does not of necessity involve for it any kind of union with God or participation in His life. Man might have exercised his reason simply upon the beings of the created world and in self-reflection upon his own nature; indeed, many people actually try to do so to-day. He might have been led to the conviction of a Supreme Being as the ground of the universe and to construct for himself something like the Aristotelian arguments for the existence of God.

[1] *Summa Theol.*, II, 1, cxix.

He might well have longed to know more about this God than he had managed to find out for himself. But he could not have conceived the possibility—still less could he have achieved the actualization—of a real elevation and participation in the life of God. He would have had to be content with a merely natural beatitude, in which any regret at the absence of anything higher would be compensated by the reflection that what he already had was all that a finite being had any right to expect.

If, however, a finite rational being can neither expect nor effect his elevation into the life of God, there is nothing to prevent God, if He sees fit, from conferring it upon him. As a *rational* being man is constitutionally adapted for knowing whatever is knowable, even while as a *finite* being he can know only what is finite. Hence, if he is to know that which is supremely knowable—namely, God—God must confer upon him a power which by nature he cannot have. Man's *potentia obedientialis* for the supernatural is not a mere nothing; were that so, a cow would be as fit for elevation to life in God as a man is. Grace is thus not merely something added to nature, but something that completes and perfects it. Nature is not only accompanied by grace, but elevated by it. Supernature is neither contrary to nature, nor indifferent to it; rather it is nature's fulfilment.

With such considerations in mind Fr Charlier has written as follows: " What is first in the divine intention and willed therein defines a being better, in the eyes of the theologian, in its concrete existence (*donné*) than does its metaphysical constitution. I am first of all a child of God before I am a rational animal. . . . There is, indeed, a radical distinction between the orders of nature and grace. The supernatural order is, indeed, above the powers and requirements of nature. Furthermore, when we interpret the gifts of grace into philosophical language, we must say that they are accidents, and indeed contingent accidents in relation to nature. But the theologian must not put the stress primarily on this. Seen in God, our sonship by adoption is the essential element in what God has willed to make of us. Hence, grace does not appear to the theologian as an inherently indifferent *superadditum* to our nature. Is not God's primary design to make us, His creatures, into His children, and to create for this a nature capable of receiving such a gift and altogether directed towards this sublime end ?"[1]

When the Catholic doctrine is expounded in this way, it is clear that it differs from the teaching of Brunner and Niebuhr far less than appeared at first sight. It must not, however, be assumed that the difference is negligible. Brunner and Niebuhr from their standpoint, like their complete opposite Berdyaev from his, reject quite definitely the idea that God ever confers

[1] *Essai sur le Problème théologique*, p. 157.

upon His creatures anything that the nature which He has initially given to them does not, in some form or other, include; for them, all that man can ever become is somehow contained in his primary constitution. In contrast, Catholicism leaves the way open for a whole succession of gifts which depend upon the sheer bounty of God, none of which can be demanded by man's nature though all of them are compatible with it. In consequence, for the Catholic the spiritual life becomes an adventure filled with the most glorious surprises, and the soul constantly finds itself exclaiming, like the Queen of Sheba when confronted by the splendour of King Solomon, that the half had not been told it. And it may be suggested that in this contrast is to be found the explanation of the flat repudiation which is common to practically all the neo-Protestant theologians, and which is found in Barth and Nygren[1] no less than in Brunner and Niebuhr, of all forms of mysticism.

For, as soon as we forget or deny the teaching of the great Catholic mystical theologians, that mystical union with God, in all its degrees and forms, is a pure gift conferred by God, from which the soul can indeed, by the help of grace, remove obstacles but which all its own personal efforts are powerless to achieve, we shall find ourselves falling into one of two errors. We may, on the one hand, conceive the mystical union as the elevation of the soul by its own powers to the level of a deity who is thought of as purely transcendent (the Plotinian " flight of the alone to the alone "), and in this case there is a virtual denial of the creatureliness of man. Or we shall, on the other hand, set forward a technique for the identification of the human personality with a God who is thought of as located purely in the depths of the human soul (as in the teaching of Brahmanism, and of such Western writers as Boehme and Berdyaev), and in this case there is a virtual denial of the divine transcendence.[2] Against all such types of mystical theory the opposition of the neo-Protestants is justified. Their criticisms do not, however, prevail against the teaching of the great Catholic mystical doctors, such as St Teresa and St John of the Cross, with their two fundamental doctrines of a God who is transcendent before He is immanent[3] and of mystical union as achieved not by any human effort, but by the unconditioned act of God Himself, who elevates the soul into a participation of His own divine life.[4]

[1] *Cf.* Barth, *Epistle to the Romans*, p. 109, etc. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, ii, p. 483 *f.*, etc.

[2] Brunner refers to both these types; cf. *The Mediator*, pp. 292 and 293, n. 1. So, though less clearly, does Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. i, p. 61.

[3] *Cf.* Przywara: " For the Catholic foundation of religion, which is the *analogia entis*, all other bases for religion count as immanental. *The God of Catholicism alone is the truly transcendent deity.*"—*Polarity*, p. 38.

[4] *Cf.*, *e.g.*, St Teresa, *Interior Castle*, Mans. IV, chap. i. St John of the Cross, *Dark Night*, Bk. I, chap. viii; *Living Flame*, *passim.*

It is, we may remark, most regrettable that so many both of the supporters and of the opponents of mysticism in recent years have taken as representatives of Christian mystical theology such very untypical figures as Eckhart or even Angelus Silesius, rather than the great Spanish Carmelites. Thus, on the one side, Dr Inge describes Eckhart as " the greatest of all speculative mystics,"[1] while Berdyaev singles out Eckhart and Angelus Silesius for special approval.[2] On the other side Brunner claims to show that mysticism and Christianity are incompatible by arguing for a substantial identity in the teaching of Eckhart and the tenth-century Indian Sankara,[3] while Niebuhr similarly uses Eckhart in order to show that mysticism necessarily contradicts human creatureliness.[4]

The prevalent confusion about mysticism has not been lessened by the discussion in Mr Aldous Huxley's book *Grey Eminence*, in which Catholic mysticism is condemned for quite a different reason than that of the neo-Protestants. According to Huxley, Catholic mysticism, at least in its later manifestations, has postulated as its object not the super-essential—and, as he suggests, impersonal—Deity, but the human nature of Jesus of Nazareth, with results that he alleges have been disastrous for both personal and political life. It must be replied that, whatever may be true in individual cases, Catholic mysticism, like Catholic liturgy and Catholic religion in general, does not make the Incarnate Lord the ultimate terminus of its devotion. Catholicism is Christocentric in the precise sense that Christ is its *centre*—the Christian is *in* Christ, and his approach to the Father is *through* Christ; but it is not, if we may coin a word, Christoterminal. " No man cometh unto the Father but by Me," " I am the way, the truth and the life," " Your life is hid with Christ in God," " Through Him we both [Jews and Gentiles] have access by one Spirit unto the Father "—these are the great texts of Catholic devotion. *Per Christum ad Patrem in Spiritu* is the pattern of Catholic life. And it is precisely by this union with and incorporation into the Incarnate Lord that the Christian is raised up into that participation in the life of God whose supreme earthly manifestation is mystical union. It is thus the Catholic mystical tradition, and not the anti-mysticism of neo-Protestantism, that is truly Christian and Pauline. Was it not the Apostle of the Gentiles who was caught up to the third heaven and heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter ?

In making these criticisms of Dr Brunner and Dr Niebuhr it is not in the least intended to suggest that their work is not of quite remarkable value or that nothing remains to be added to

[1] *Christian Mysticism*, p. 148. [2] *Freedom and the Spirit*, p. 194.
[3] *The Mediator*, p. 110, n. 2.
[4] *Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. i, p. 61 *f.* (*Cf.* pp. 134, 145.)

the traditional Catholic formulation of the theology of grace and nature. It is, however, suggested that the inability of these brilliant thinkers to give a constructive treatment of so central a feature of historic Christianity as mysticism shows the existence of a radical defect in their positions. That the problem of grace and nature is the central theological issue of the present time can hardly be denied; but it would seem that advance is to be made rather by deepening and developing the traditional doctrine of Western Christendom than upon the principles of the neo-Protestant revival. Indeed, as Dr Demant recently suggested,[1] it may well be one of the results of Niebuhr's work that Anglican theology will at last make some serious attempt to find its true orientation.

E. L. Mascall, O.G.S.

SURVEY OF DEVOTIONAL BOOKS

The Bishop of Southwell (Dr F. R. Barry) is not generally awarded by the younger generation a ready place among the prophets. His works certainly do not easily accord with some of the moods of post-liberal theology, and indeed there is much that he has written that perhaps to-day hardly requires refutation. Yet for all that we need not go so far as to deny at once the insight and the wisdom of his choice of title for his best-known book—*The Relevance of Christianity*. It was a phrase that again and again echoed in the present writer's mind as he "surveyed" the devotional books in front of him. It conceals a challenge which post-liberal Christian thought can only sidetrack at the risk of its soul, and it is one which perhaps our literature of devotion more easily reveals than that of any other theological genre. As he looks out upon a world groaning in the agony of an unintelligible passion, it ill becomes the young Christian publicist to begin his writing with a lecture. The first words on his lips surely must be, "Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa," and that mood of humility must reflect itself in his writing. Post-liberal theologians claim a realism that their liberal predecessors lacked. They claim to be theologically and spiritually hard-boiled. Yet are they? Do they honestly see the magnitude of the task they have set themselves? It is not enough simply to recover the majestic body of Christian truth from the winding-sheet of idealist philosophy in which a previous generation had laid it to rest, and to present it to twentieth-century man thus resuscitated. For, as Mr Mervyn Stockwood pointed out at Malvern, twentieth-century man simply does not see what the fuss is about. The battle of older and younger theologians is a delightful game, but one that

[1] "The Importance of Niebuhr," in Theology, May, 1942.

perhaps one should not hesitate to call at least potentially idealist in the Marxian sense. It may take one's mind off the present task, which is surely that of incarnating the Christ-life in the relative of the twentieth-century, of unifying our theory with the practice of our social life.

So we come to these books. And what do we find? They are one and all works for the initiate; that is true (alas!) even of Fr Gerald Vann's *Of his Fulness* (Burns Oates, 5s.), and of the S.P.C.K.'s admirable reprint of the C.S.P.'s *Prayers at the Eucharist in the Words of the Holy Scripture* (2s.). The latter is absolutely first-rate, and is an ideal gift for intelligent confirmees. We congratulate the S.P.C.K. on its enterprise in reprinting the work. But even there the gulf remains. The problem of the Biblical language, for instance, is delicately ignored. Yet Hoskyns remembered (and was not afraid to glory in the memory of) the foreignness of the Biblical language to our own. To those who have the time and energy for Biblical study this book will be a gold-mine, a fount of inspiration. But how many are there who have that time? For the rest—what of them? For them factual terms acquire their definition in the life of a world whose assumptions concerning significance are frankly verificationist. Think that point through with reference to so fundamental a religious antithesis (integral to Hellenic and Hebraic schematization alike) as that of light and darkness. Contrast the significance of those terms, *e.g.*, in the account of the education of the philosophers, and of the redemption of the prisoners in Plato's *Republic*, and in the Johannine writings on the one side, and in their more or less sophisticated modern-scientific employment on the other. The fissure in the modern spirit issues from the fact that its assumption is to assign definiteness and finality of significance only to terms that can be thus literally and phenomenalistically determined. What cannot so be precisioned is extruded on to the periphery of the irrelevant and half-true. So arises (as Fr Demant rightly insists) the fact that our "vestigial Christianity" is one of our public profession (I am not merely thinking of national days of prayers and state-organized religious hokum of that kind) and not of the springs of our action.

The tremendous theoretical problems this line of thought must uncover are problems from which a certain type of Christian mind dearly loves to escape into vague, quasi-Platonic chatter of eternal truth. Yet that ignores alike the knife-edge of Aristotle's criticism of Plato in *Eth. Nic.* I, 6, and the reality of the Incarnation as well. God is eternal indeed, but, as members of Christ's mystical body, we are to spend ourselves in the manifestation of His glory to the healing of the nations.

Of course we are involved to-day in a situation in which the most dreadful element is surely our sense of the sheer irrelevance to its course of personal living upon the plane where the language

of meeting and encounter is appropriate, and which seems to be the setting presupposed by any intelligible presentation of the Christian message. Of course we must allow that our concept of person is formed less by meditation on the mystery of the Trinity than by an uncritical acceptance of liberal individualistic standards of reference. Yet even so it seems very hard to understand what personal relation looks like concretized in the bombing of Rostock and Cologne. Dr Oldham's delicate evasions on such points in the *Christian News-Letter* have met in Oxford at least some rather devastating comment that does not require quotation. Yet it would be hard to deny the necessity of such means of victory. One may, of course, speak of the *vita abscondita cum Christo in Deo*, whose fruits are known to faith alone, provided that one remembers at the same time that one is bidden to let one's light shine before men, etc. Yet is that enough? Does not the life of Christian devotion demand the apologetic of outward effectiveness when the whole citadel of man's life is menaced, as it is to-day, by "a revolution of destruction"? Is there, or is there not, a form of Christian life for to-day that will speak its relevance, that will translate the Christ-act into the here and now?

Or must we lapse into defeatism, trotting out the many fatuities of, *e.g.*, J. B. Mozley's University Sermon on war? A prophet, you say? Yet are we to find the Christian mind only where men turn their face to the wall? Perhaps the Apostles sleeping in Gethsemane had pleasant dreams of an ivory tower, insulated and secluded from human agony and questioning. It was left to an angel to strengthen the God-man.

Looking at our books again, we must pass many by. They do not speak to our need, good though they are. *Caritas Christi*, by Fr Maryon-Wilson (Pax House, 1s. 6d.), has many excellences, but retreat addresses to Anglican Benedictinesses are not perhaps the layman's most obvious requirement. Fr Mascall's *Guide to Mount Carmel* (Dacre Press, 3s.) can be commended to all who, under Huxleyan influence, want to find out what St John of the Cross really taught. Dr Crafer's *Healing Miracles in the Acts* (S.P.C.K., 1s.) has supposedly *some* use. Fr Roche's *Light of the Anxious Heart* (Burns Oates, 6s.) is Roman Catholic broadcast stuff. Francis Wheeler's *Priest and his Prayer* (S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.) has its uses for entrants to theological colleges. Fr Thorold's *The Mass and the Life of Prayer* (Sheed and Ward, 3s. 6d.) invites comparison with Dom Wesseling's articles and Maurice Zundel's books, and it fails to pass that test. Fr Kearney's *Treasure in Heaven* (Burns Oates, 6s.) is worth some attention as an introduction to the religious life. Fr Macnabb's *Mary of Nazareth* (Burns Oates, 5s.) is a typical compost of insight and extravagance. Fr Harton's *Mystery of the Cross* (Mowbray's, 1s. 6d.) has all his strength and weakness.

Perhaps the best book on our list is Dom Marmion's *Words of*

Life (Sands, 5s.). The reviewer is of course prejudiced in Marmion's regard, as that great Belgian director's works have long been a staple diet for his meditations. But Marmion helps one to get to grips with the fundamental verities that lie beneath our life in Christ and determine its peculiar structure. His theological strength is tremendous, and even though he does not give us the solution of our problem, he does not distract our understanding from the search.

All this may seem churlish and academic. Yet God knows, if these are not our central problems, what are? Is there such a thing as meaningful, socially transformative Christian action, issuing from a truly "incarnating" life of prayer, for us in the here and now? Have Christian devotional writers a more urgent task than the mapping of that life? And have they begun to do so? It is possible that Wesseling, Zundel and the other theological writers of the liturgical movement take us as far as any on this way. But with them I have not here had to concern myself.

D. M. Mackinnon.

BRIGHTER COUNTRY CLERGY

Everybody in the ecclesiastical world finds fault with the country clergy. What, then, is wrong with them? May one of them suggest certain sins of which he feels himself to be guilty?

We lack endurance. Ministry in the country does not bear fruit for very many years. As a parishioner of mine said of a priest who had just completed twenty-three years' work in one benefice, "Mr Blank, 'e carry on that queer at first; but 'e's settlin' down nicely now!" Sometimes family necessities, or financial advantage, or even the sheer misery of the dark night of our souls, will dictate a change. But by such changes the Church loses practically all the results of our labour. Life in a country parsonage is hard and lonely, desperately lonely, but only those who endure to the end can expect to do Christ any abiding service.

We are very vain. We are miserable because we can only attract a tiny proportion of our parishioners to worship. But our misery is more often a matter of personal pique and frustrated ambition than a real solicitude for God and His Church. And by way of compensation we tend to exaggerate unduly our importance as priests, and to resent blame and ridicule.

We are narrowly parochial. We have to go on year after year with the same people and the same scenes, mostly very dull in both cases, and we come at last to lose any knowledge of, or concern with, the larger world. Small parish squabbles become issues of almost cosmic importance, and we are interested and busy about little local matters to the detriment of our studies

and our devotions. And thus cultured people find us petty, fussy, and silly.

We are very conservative, not to say obscurantist. The world of knowledge has swept past us, and we hate to have to adapt ourselves and our outlook to anything new. Our minds, if not our bodies, grow lazy in the absence of contact with people of culture and education. Our parishioners do not bother to make, and are seldom sufficiently advanced to be able to make, any searching criticism of our teaching, and our intelligence gets gradually blunted.

Certain alterations and organizations would, I suggest, lead to some improvement of us rural clergy.

There should be compulsory retirement at a fixed age. A priest at the age of, say, seventy cannot be trusted to retire of his own free will, when this means finding a new house, perhaps among strangers. Yet very old men are a serious hindrance to reforms and improvements in churches and parishes, and their teaching is always out of date.

Parishes might be grouped in larger numbers than they are now, with small colleges of priests to serve them—say three or four priests to twelve or fourteen parishes. No! not a vicar and three curates with motor-cycles, for what should we do with the curates when they reached the age of ministerial discretion? What we need is something nearer to the model of a Dean and Chapter of a cathedral, only the priests should live in different villages, so as to obviate the frictions which the novelists say arise in cathedral closes. Thus priests would carry on their general work as they do now, and any of us who had special gifts as teachers, or evangelists, or what not, would have reasonable scope for their use, because for his special activities a priest would be expected to range over the whole group. Also by such a system of grouping the younger and healthier men would be able to help out the older and more sickly, including the worn-out town vicars for whom some provision must be made. Much give-and-take in the matter of ceremonial and in the assignment of duties would be necessary, but this would be a salutary discipline, while no priest would be able to play the hermit. The president of the college, who had better not hold the position permanently, would frequently draw his men together for prayer and study as well as for business meetings.

These priests should receive payment by age and length of service according to an equitable scale. There should be family allowances, and when placing men the authorities should take due notice of the nearness of secondary schools. Tenure should depend on faithful discharge of duties, and should not be freehold.

By suppressing one or more of the benefices in each group, and by pooling the revenues of the rest, money might be available for a typist who would work for the whole group, and

perhaps there might be enough to pay for a gardener who would visit each garden in turn. It should, however, be a recognized principle of a rural priest's life that he should engage in a considerable amount of manual labour. The gardens have their uses. As the halls go out of occupation, the vicarage garden may be the only place available as a public park for the parishioners, and if they are to serve this purpose they must be kept in decent order. Similarly the houses are not private residences, but public resorts where the manifold activities of parish life may find a home.

There should be regular holidays of fixed length. Individual priests should not be required to find substitutes for themselves during their absences, and they should not have to take " locums " where they may be required to do as much Sunday duty as they do at home. The practice of holiday exchanges might continue as far as the use of houses is concerned. This makes possible a cheap holiday where probably none would otherwise take place. But need there be any sermons? Could not the lay readers help a great deal more here than at present they are allowed to do?

Not, indeed, that these changes would of themselves solve the problem of the country ministry. On the contrary, at first the strain on tempers in the priestly colleges would be almost intolerable, while it would be very many years before the parishioners would really accept the situation. Over and above administrative reforms we need an outpouring of the Divine Spirit upon us who serve the country-side. We need conversion. Our troubles are spiritual at bottom. The material difficulties of our conditions do not fully account for our sin, and if we could be revived, made to live again, in the Cross, we should be able to face our material difficulties far more boldly and successfully. Will, then, those whose work for Christ, whether as laymen or as priests, lies in happier and easier places than country parsonages, please pray for us and our conversion.

J. W. Parker.

CORRESPONDENCE

ANALOGY, AQUINAS AND BISHOP BERKELEY

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

Your June issue has only just come to hand through the kindness of a friend who passes on his copy to me. I hope I am not too late to add a footnote to the Rev. W. W. S. March's interesting article on " Analogy, Aquinas and Bishop Berkeley."

Browne resumed the controversy in the *Analogy* of 1733, which Berkeley ignored. In replying to the argument of *Alciphron*, Dialogue IV, Secs. 17-22, Browne follows Berkeley into the arena of scholastic philosophy. Mr March has pointed out how Berkeley's eighteenth-century appeal to Thomism failed; it is interesting to note that Browne met with no greater success.

The whole controversy, as Browne acknowledges, turns upon one fundamental issue—viz., he regards the Divine nature and attributes as being entirely different in kind from the nature and attributes of human beings, while Berkeley appears to hold that they differ only in degree, albeit in an infinite degree. Berkeley says (Sec. 21): "We may . . . affirm that all sorts of perfection which we can conceive in a finite spirit are in God, but without any of that alloy which is found in the creatures"; and again (Sec. 22): "God is a thinking, intelligent being, in the same sense with other spirits, though not in the same imperfect manner or degree." In modern terminology, the epistemological differences of the two Bishops are due to their ultimate differences of metaphysical outlook.

Browne thinks he has St Thomas to support him in his contention that the Divine nature and attributes are different in kind from the nature and attributes of human beings. This assumption lies behind his exegesis of the angelic doctor on pp. 451-462 of the *Analogy*. But is St Thomas really on Browne's side? I do not think so. Speaking subject to correction by Thomistic experts, I do not think that Aquinas says expressly that God is different in kind absolutely from His creatures. Browne correctly quotes him as saying that God is "extra omne genus" (*Analogy*, p. 457; *Summa*, Part I, Question IV, Art. III); but he should have noticed the consequence for his own position of the whole sentence of which he only quotes a part. What Aquinas says is: "Dicendum, quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas *sicut res diversorum generum*; sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus et principium omnium generum" (italics mine). In other words, as I understand him, the import of St Thomas' words is that the question whether God is the same in kind as His creatures or not does not arise at all, is not relevant in any way, simply because the category of genus and species does not apply to Him. He is no genus. Therefore Browne was no more successful than Berkeley in his appeal to Aquinas.

Yours sincerely,

R. F. Hipwell.

S. Fin Barre's,
Cork,
June 30, 1942.

BOOK REVIEWS

Secular Illusion or Christian Realism? By D. R. Davies. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 4s. 6d.

Although this book is branded and blurbed as the "Archbishop of York's Lent book" for this year, it would be a pity if Dr Temple's admirable choice were set aside and ignored with the coming of Easter. For this is a book, if not of perennial value (for its chief virtue lies in its vigorous topicality), at least of enduring significance for our present circumstances and proximate future.

There are still a good many stray bits of secular utopianism about—not merely in public utterances, where they are to be expected, but in the thought and speech of ordinary people, even of professing Christians. Mental habits and assumptions which have held the field for over a century, and been gaining ground in centuries before, cannot of course be changed over-night, however catastrophic the revelation of their fallacy: as Mr Davies shrewdly points out (p. 10), mere exposure of fallacy only leaves the mind disintegrated, and it requires a supernatural faith to give it coherence once again, focussed now on truth in place of error. But it is still a shock to discover how deeply this secular habit of mind has taken root in souls, not merely nominally Christian, but (to all appearance) truly converted and sincerely pious. Mr Davies, himself a fervent prophet of secular utopianism years ago, is now concerned with no less fervour to expose this subtly-growing weed, as well in himself as in others, that the Faith which all Christians profess may be the sole and effective determinant of all their thinking.

The aim and the performance are both commendable. Mr Davies digs up and examines many a notion which we have cherished, fondly supposing it to be reconcilable with the Christian Faith: Socialism, Pacifism, Psycho-analysis in their manifold forms are tracked down, pinned and pilloried for their absurd pretension to replace, to support or even to rest upon the faith in Jesus Christ and Him crucified. It is an exhilarating chase, riding after Mr Davies while he views fresh foxes from every spinney and hunts down each one before it goes to earth again: and few of us would not be vastly refreshed and braced by a season, or even a day, with his pack.

Sometimes in his excitement Mr Davies stumbles a little. Even modern warfare has not yet become cannibalism! ("War is the product of civilization, of developing, progressive society. There is good reason for believing that primitive man was a vegetarian, not a carnivore," p. 20). Nor is the "discovery of the Unconscious" quite so recent as Freud: Mr Davies draws out some useful illustrations of the contemporary political scene

from Freudian experiments, but the reader is left wondering what Christian doctors of ascetic theology, confessors and directors of souls (and for that matter practitioners of older religions like the Egyptians and the Druids) have been doing through all the preceding centuries if it were indeed left to the Viennese professor to make this psychological discovery. But by and large Mr Davies rides down his fox triumphantly and gathers his pack of arguments round for a grand kill. In exposing the vanity and absurdity of secular idealism he has done an excellent piece of work, taking up the numerous notions and assumptions still common amongst us and displaying their lack of intellectual ground, rational consistency and experiential durability, and all in a manner so breezy and with such copious illustration as to be readable even by the most cursory headline-reader.

It is in his presentation of Christian Realism that Mr Davies is rather less satisfying or successful. In his reaction against the sentimental optimism of "liberal" Christian thinking (or rather feeling) he narrowly escapes falling into the inverted sentimentalism of unqualified pessimism. "Evil in man is fundamental," says Mr Davies, a proposition which requires a good deal of qualification to be substantiated. Of course, in contrast to the notion that "evil is really an accident" in the sense that it can be cured by better drainage or higher education or just "Progress," it can be argued that evil is fundamental. But the word is unhappy: and when Mr Davies goes on to pillory the propositions "Goodness is innate: evil is acquired" as a monstrous absurdity, he ranges himself not merely against the whole corpus of Catholic theology, but against Holy Scripture itself. The truth about man revealed by God is that man *is* in his essential nature good, and that evil *was* acquired.[1] It is indeed a lamentable error to suppose that evil, once acquired, can be naturally outgrown or cured by natural means; but it is no less lamentable to suppose that it cannot be outgrown or cured at all. There is a sense in which even "better education" might be said to be the cure for evil: "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." But granted that this knowledge must be real and not notional, and that it can be acquired only by the free gift of God and not by any merely human effort; granted that the perverted wills and disordered affections of sinful men need not merely mortification, but the new discipline and vigour of divine grace; it remains true that the purpose and effect of salvation is first and

[1] It is even doubtful if evil can be said to be acquired. Evil is by definition a *privatio boni*—*i.e.*, in itself a negation. The privation of good in man leads to spiritual corruption: this is Sin. The process has been well described as "a deprivation resulting in a measure of depravation." The distinction is worth observing.

foremost to heal the wounded nature of man, to restore it to health (*salvum facere*) and to its own pristine integrity, whatever *dona superaddita* may accrue as well. Mr Davies seems merely to have substituted for a fallacious belief in the natural perfectibility of man an equally fallacious belief in his imperfectibility even by grace: whilst his deliberately popular style makes it unfair to charge him with formally stating any definite doctrine of grace, his general argument suggests a hang-over of Lutheran influence in the assumption that human nature *is* fundamentally and essentially sinful, and that grace is a cloak to cover it rather than a medicine to heal it, or that it is the creation of a new thing rather than the restoration and perfection of the old.

The reaction against " liberalism " has now reached a point which makes it opportune to raise these issues explicitly. As a correction of the secular idealism which so long influenced and even passed for Christian belief and sentiment, it is valuable—indeed, indispensable—to emphasize the doctrine of the Fall, of Sin and of Redemption, as the modern revival of Protestant theology has done. But it is important to remember that these doctrines are, so to say, the negative pole, over against the positive doctrine of the Creation: or, to put it in terms of Christian devotion, that the Sorrowful Mysteries are the negative pole to the Joyful, whence springs the incandescent light of the Glorious. True Christian Realism can no more be equated with " Peccatavism " (if such a word may be made to cover theological positions such as are commonly labelled " Barthian ") than it can with the facile " Incarnationalism " which Mr McKinnon exposed and pummelled so vigorously at Malvern (where it was deplorably rife). The truth of Christianity lies in its " third term "—the Resurrection and Ascension: *gratia perficit naturam*—that same nature which God made in His own image, and which by its very existence retains always a degree of " virtue " without which it could not even exist, fallen though it be, sinful, perverted and corrupt, is itself purged, healed, restored and glorified.

One other criticism needs to be made: in his generally admirable chapter on the " only radical solution " Mr Davies betrays the common confusion regarding the relations between society and the person. Thus on p. 86 he observes that " the radical reshaping of human society is not the work of Christians in isolation . . . the radical solution of the human problems will not be achieved by the converting of separate individuals and then adding them up: that idea is the disease of a merely statistical Christianity "; but ten pages earlier he writes: " For society to become Christian, all its members must be Christian." This is to put the cart before the horse. Persons are not in the same category as individuals (as Maritain has continually insisted, notably in his last volume *Scholasticism and Politics*,

ch. iii). So far as their relations can be summarized in a phrase, it may be expressed thus:

> Individuals are the constituent or component elements of Society: Persons are the product of Society.

The mere re-ordering of social relationships will not of itself "christianize" its members; but it will necessarily either prohibit or encourage the "christianization" of the great majority, as Mr Davies himself notes in his appreciation of Professor Toynbee.[1]

It is because persons are in so large a degree shaped by the configuration and structure of the society they live in, that so much of our attention is to-day turned to sociology; and it is for the same reason that conversion must always be, and has always been held to be, a change not merely in an individual manner of living, but from one form of social influence to another. In one sense it may be true that the kingdom of God can never be identified with the historic Church; in another sense it is equally true, and must be emphatically maintained, that the Church, even the empirical Church, is not merely the arena in which the kingdom of God (conceived as a distinct entity) will come, but is that kingdom itself even here and now. This is so to the extent that in it men find, despite or even through the human imperfections and maladjustments incidental even to the best of human societies, the root principles of social ordering which are essentially in conformity with their own nature.

This, however, is in no way to derogate from the value of Mr Davies' thesis. If in certain details it seems to require qualification, if in others it would profit by more careful and precise expression in order to avoid unnecessary ambiguities or contradictions, this is a most valuable book which to the critical reader may be recommended unconditionally, and to the less critical without undue misgiving.

BERDEN. P. McLAUGHLIN.

LAW WITH LIBERTY. By Geoffrey Allen. S.C.M. Press. 5s.

At the end of his book Mr Allen prints "the map of the dialectic movement in which we are engaged," in which his argument is expressed in diagrammatic form. The map covers the following subjects: The Family, Individual Psychology, Political Organization, Economic Organization, Law and Grace, the Church, Collective Action, Theology. Each subject exhibits the same dialectic of three stages: (1) *Thesis:* Authority. (1*a*) *The first disillusionment:* The fallibility of authority. (2) *Antithesis:* Revolt into independence. (2*a*) *The second disillusionment:*

[1] P. 94: "What are the social changes and developments which will most encourage the Christianisation of the individual?"

The fallibility of the self. (3) *Synthesis:* Free fellowship, authority and free assent, centralized organization and individual initiative. Here are two examples of how this works out. Economic organization: (1) Communal ownership. The communal ownership of property in the tribe. Communism (as a return to this first stage after the second disillusionment). (1*a*) The individual claims private ownership of property from the community. (2) Private ownership and the quest for immediate profit. *Laissez-faire* individualism. (2*a*) " The husks of the swine." The economic breakdown of individualist capitalism. (3) State socialism combined with a responsible and modified measure of private property. On the Church, Mr Allen opposes an authoritarian Catholicism to the assertion of religious liberty in Protestantism and finds their synthesis in " the Œcumenical Movement. The reunion of Catholic and Protestant traditions. Revelation as the synthesis of the external illumination of the Spirit." The theological basis of all this is apparently the conviction (pp. 23-4, 117) that the logic of thought is also the logic of history, and that there is an essential correspondence between both and the truths of God with which theology deals.

This book ought not to be read except as an awful example of what undisciplined Christian thought about man's present predicament degenerates into. Mr Allen's thought is often " on the right lines," but depressingly because unilluminatingly so. The criticism is not that the book is virile but offensive: on the contrary, the greatest issues are dissolved into an all-encompassing mush. The ordinary reader is betrayed when he is not given the popularization of great conceptions, but merely allowed to overhear some not impressive thinking aloud. This book is unhappily evidence for those who assert that religion is dope. The readers who accept Mr Allen's guidance will not be stimulated to any hard thinking or courageous action, but will be helped to remain content with unexamined clichés and complacent in the midst of chaos. If only the author had devoted real attention to asking what (if anything) his terms for synthesis mean, how his readers could explore that meaning, what dangers lurk in this synthesis, how we can move even a little towards it, things might have been different. One can only hope that Mr Allen will cultivate a sense of humour and some candid friends, and that some at any rate of those who receive this book as members of the S.C.M. Religious Book Club will read it with a mounting sense of *anger*.

H. Cunliffe-Jones.

Bradford.

KIERKEGAARD'S CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT. Translated from the Danish by David F. Swenson. Completed after his death and provided with introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie. Oxford Univ. Press. 36s.

With this volume translation of all Kierkegaard's main work has been completed. Here the faithful labours of Dr Swenson, aided by the praiseworthy zeal of Dr Lowrie, enable us to know Kierkegaard for himself in what is undoubtedly his most comprehensive and important work. A few years ago he was known to the English-speaking world mainly as an influence on continental philosophy and theology, on Jaspers and Heidegger, on Barth and Brunner and Heim. It is not too much to expect that from now on, in his own right, by this and the rest of his work, he will exercise a capital influence not only on what we think, but also on how we think and relate ourselves to and preach and hear preached the matter of Christian faith.

Since Kierkegaard uses his own highly-original categories and terminology to break up ground that has long lain fallow, it is only to be expected that at least modest enquiries should be made about the propriety of the translation; and in general it seems that the flexibility and humour and exuberant force of the thought are faithfully represented in the English.[1] The easy-going discursiveness of some parts, with sudden changes of style and quickening of tempo, the constant disclaimers of importance (for Kierkegaard always spoke "without authority"), even the repetitiousness of the cumulative argument, are all part of Kierkegaard's authentic style and purpose.

The comprehensiveness of Kierkegaard's thought is reached by intensity rather than extension of treatment. He has deepened rather than widened the sphere of Christianity. For his purpose is to understand *how to become a Christian*. This he sees as a matter for the single individual. No other person can present you with the conclusions of his faith and thereby make you a Christian. Becoming a Christian is determined not by any proof or certainty of demonstration, which you accept "as a matter of course," but by how you meet and appropriate Christianity's "existential communication." To this end Kierkegaard elaborates his special method of "indirect communication":

> [For my introduction to the becoming a Christian] is quite unlike any introduction which proceeds on the assumption that Christianity is a doctrine. An introduction of this kind does not lead to becoming

[1] But why, on p. 449, should *det egne Jeg* (*its own I*) be translated by "the person of the individual," then a few lines lower by "the personal ego"? The same periphrasis is passable, but two are too many. This tendency to ponderousness is a real drawback, for S. K. is never ponderous—except for deliberate effect.

a Christian, but leads at most to the perception, historically motivated, that Christianity has certain advantages over paganism, Judaism, and so forth. The introduction that I propose to offer will be repellent, making it difficult to become a Christian. It will not conceive of Christianity as a doctrine, but as an existential contradiction and an existential communication.

Doctrine—or, better, teaching [*Lære*]—is an insufficient description of Christianity because here the Teacher gives Himself with His teaching. Any lesser understanding leaves you with the speculative, objective view of history and of the world (typified for Kierkegaard in Hegel's System), or with the doctrines of the Church, or with the inerrancy of Scripture, or with the age and influence of Christianity as your substitute for an existential relation to the truth. With brilliant force Kierkegaard shows how this objective, proof-seeking attitude is essentially unrealistic, yielding only approximations and probabilities. (" One becomes objective, objectively one sits down to contemplate, that God was crucified. . . .")

But faith is " against the understanding." Faith has no buttress of security either in the magnificence of reasoned proof or in dispassionate observation. " Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity." Faith involves risk, it has to do with what, in an objective sense, is uncertain, and has continually to be appropriated in the passion of inwardness. " If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent on holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over 70,000 fathoms of water, still preserving my faith." Faith is not an approximation to knowing, but is the only possible way of living in relation to the truth of Christianity. It is the passion of inwardness involved in becoming a Christian, the absolute relation to the absolute.

Not since Tertullian has faith been presented with such vehemence as an appropriation *against* the understanding, in virtue of the absurd. After all that Kierkegaard himself has said about reviews and reviewers, it would be ridiculous to attempt here any more precise description of Kierkegaard's thought. That would be to attempt the very thing against which he constantly inveighs, the objective presentation of truth in a direct and readily assimilated way. His way of raising every problem when he raises this one problem, of what it means to become a Christian, will disturb, as it is meant to disturb, all who crave security in place of faith.

Thus he has much to say about baptism, about the forgiveness of sins, and about the nature of the Christian address. Both those who make and those who hear sermons are bound to be intensely interested in his categories or spheres of existence, the æsthetic, the ethical, and the religious, and his further discrimination between religiousness A (religion of immanence and directness) and religiousness B (Christian faith, indirect, reached

by a " leap," in the category of despair, in faith in the God-man). The whole theme is directly related to " that individual," the solitary responsible individual, for whom alone the ethical has meaning, over against all collectivisms, all Christianity in the mass and " as a matter of course." With startling modernity and passionate concern for the real matter of faith, the attainment of eternal blessedness by a living relation with the paradox of the historical God, Kierkegaard presses the absolute demand of faith.

Those who take faith seriously would do better to read this big, difficult and searching book than a dozen books by theologians or philosophers who have not yet come to grips with Kierkegaard's thought.

Ronald Gregor Smith.

Selkirk.

The Christian Church and the Soviet State. By Serge Bolshakoff. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

There is to-day a widespread interest in Russia. Books, articles, lectures and films dealing with Russia and her people are in great demand. The problem of the present state of religion in U.S.S.R. attracts special attention, and it is often debated in religious and secular press.

The chief difficulty which confronts English people when they want to understand the Soviet experiment is the intensely religious nature of Russian atheism. The Godless movement sponsored by the Soviet Government does not attack any particular Church, but attacks everyone who dares to believe in God. This idea of an organized rebellion against God looks so fantastic to an average Englishman that there is no wonder that most of the books and articles published here fail to present an objective and convincing picture of the Russian religious struggle. Mr Bolshakoff's book aims at supplying this need. Its author has collected a good deal of interesting material, and his book will be useful to all those who are concerned with the future of Russian Christianity. Unfortunately, several limitations affect this otherwise valuable work.

It is a great pity, for instance, that the author, who knows the Russian language, hardly ever refers to the original sources and depends almost entirely on books and magazines published in English or in French. Even more disappointing is his non-critical attitude to his sources of information. He does not inform his readers whether the book he is quoting is written by an anti-Christian propagandist or represents the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox point of view. The author seems to trust too much the veracity of the printed word, with the result that the explanation he gives of the origins of the great schism in the Russian Church of the seventeenth century or the motives

behind Patriarch Tikhon's attempts at reconciliation with the Communists represents a point of view very different from that accepted by many members of the Russian Church. It is doubtful whether an objective statement on these highly controversial subjects is possible, but if the author stated plainly whose views he supports, some of this ambiguity would be avoided. This lack of discrimination leads Mr Bolshakoff sometimes into serious historical errors. He takes for granted, for instance, that the Bishops of the Russian Church up to the Florentine Union in 1439 were all Greeks, and builds on it a theory of the relations between the Church and State in Russia in the Middle Ages. As a matter of fact, the majority of the presiding Metropolitans of Kiev were of Balkan origin, but the diocesan Bishops were recruited among the Russians from the very start of Russian Christianity. This, and similar other mistakes, partially arising from sources hostile to the Russian Church which deliberately misrepresent its past history, could be easily checked if the author consulted more the Russian original sources.

But in spite of these limitations the book is worth reading, for many facts recorded in it are too little known in this country. It is not easy to understand Russia, it is difficult to find facts about the present state of religion there, and even more difficult to provide their proper interpretation. The struggle between the Communists and the believers takes place under the seal of an almost complete silence, and we are still far removed from the time when its full story can be properly and objectively written.

N. Zernov.

London.

The Meaning of the Lessons and of the Psalms. By C. M. Chavasse, Bishop of Rochester. S.P.C.K. 6s.

Liturgical prayer, the "publication of God's honour" as Jeremy Taylor calls it, cannot be undertaken lightly or wantonly. Its profundities and its secrets are only to be discovered by practice and slow progress. It cannot be supposed to be either instructive, comprehensible or edifying to those who have not accepted or do not know the dogmatic basis on which it is built or the rationale of its form. To learn to worship liturgically is in fact an education, ordered to the nullification of the clamour of self-will, and the praise of God the Holy and Blessed Trinity. It is therefore difficult to exaggerate the contemporary importance of making the Anglican Liturgy more intelligible to its users, and of revealing the spiritual wisdom, order and restraint which it contains and diffuses.

The Bishop of Rochester's object has been to do this in the limited field of the Lessons for Sundays and Holy Days and of the Psalms. The book (of which half was first published in

1933) consists of short introductions to the Lessons and Psalms, explaining why the particular lesson is chosen, what is its context and its central message. These introductions are rightly brief, and would certainly be helpful to those who use them prayerfully; for private use they can be entirely recommended, though perhaps, *e.g.*, the 23rd Psalm might safely be left to convey its own message. For public use, too, which the Bishop also advocates, they would be useful, but only where they are really necessary. This point is worth stressing, for there is a danger of the good becoming the enemy of the best. Only real necessity can justify the constant intrusion on the balance and impersonality of the liturgy which their reading would involve. It is easy to forfeit the particular and highest grace which liturgical worship conveys by giving in to the temptation, hardly recognizable as such, to point the moral and adorn the tale. "The liturgy wishes to teach," says Guardini, "but not by means of an artificial system of aim-conscious educational influences; it simply creates an entire spiritual world in which the soul can live according to the requirements of its nature" (*The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 1930, p. 95). There is also the possibility which Jeremy Taylor foresaw of "finding the spirit of devotion a little discomposed and something out of countenance" by such a diffusion of the homiletic element. But there would be no possibility of this, or of anything but benefit, if the introductions were used privately before the service, and only very sparingly and on certain occasions in the service; they would certainly help to produce that very high standard of discipline and God-centredness which the Liturgy teaches.

F. H. Maycock.

Cambridge.

The Eternal Kingdom. By C. J. Wright. James Clarke and Co. 5s.

Between God and Man. By John Hadham. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

It has been interesting to have been asked to review these two books together, for two more or less popular theological writings could not well differ more completely. It is, of course, obvious at sight that Mr Hadham's book makes nonsense of Mr Wright's. At a second reading it is equally clear that Mr Wright makes nonsense of Mr Hadham. And this second impression is more lasting than the first.

Mr Wright's book is a conventional little study of New Testament thought, rather on devotional lines, marked by a rich, intimate, and scholarly knowledge, and with the purpose of illustrating the interdependence of history and eternity. The ultimate timeless purposes of God are also His purposes to be

worked out in and by us in time. They are, in fact, as relevant to to-day as Mr Hadham could desire.

It is a pity that Mr Wright gives us no Preface or Introduction to indicate his purpose. His chapters read very like devotional addresses. They certainly will not reach the public which Mr Hadham has in mind. But they will repay the quiet study of those who already know and love their New Testament. And the truth that is in them will live when Mr Hadham, in his haste, has passed on.

Mr Hadham demands (very loudly) our immediate attention. And as he is one of the first theologians to reach Penguin country he is a person of some importance, almost as important, in fact, as a war-impressionist or a writer of detective stories. We are already under some debt to him as a vigorous popularizer of a theology which, though sometimes aggressively modernist, is nevertheless uncompromisingly Christian. His modernity is not humanism. It is God and not man whose action in history matters.

So much, of course, I knew from *Good God* and *God in a World at War*. I knew, too, that his theology is sometimes stated too starkly for accuracy, and his comments on ecclesiastics and things ecclesiastical too pungently for fairness. That is why he has become a best seller, and it was perhaps a small matter that he should, for example, repeat the usual gibes about the inactivity and worse of Archbishops at the very time when an Archbishop was giving a lead at the Malvern Conference which was at least courageous and, to many people, startling.

I came to this new book with real hope. I was predisposed to accept very much of Mr Hadham's point of view, and I expected to find it stated with freshness and vigour, and in language that would reach far beyond theological circles. And I hoped that the rather crude over-statement and unfairness of his earlier books would be toned down. I was wrong, and I am very disappointed about it.

It is nearly a good book, and bits of it are very good. Some of its faults can be forgiven, for Mr Hadham really does care for the message of warning and of reconstruction which he has to give. But, if I may copy his manner, the last paragraph but one of his Introduction (p. 16) is just offensive balderdash, and I nearly put the book down and read no more when I reached it. The remark about " a pair of tephalim hidden under the skirts of a lady " (p. 26) is a vulgarity betraying ignorance of Hebrew and even of the R.V. All the business about the synthesis achieved by " the beginners of Pharisaism " (p. 28), and the heights reached by their successors, is based upon the Liberal Jewish reconstruction of Abrahams, Montefiore, and others, for which the evidence is drawn from the Rabbinism of a date long after the New Testament. This theory, used to discredit the Gospels, ignores the fact that by far the most

important evidence for the Pharisaism of New Testament times is the New Testament itself.

One can only dip here and there. Mr Hadham is very trenchant with St Paul, with St John, with the Churches. St Paul built the bridge over which many millions have passed into Christianity, but "we must reject almost every stone which he consciously inserted" (p. 59). In St John's Gospel "the conversations of Christ become incredible and sometimes repelling" (p. 67). "The phrase 'bride of Christ' as applied to all or any of the Churches is such blasphemous nonsense that it will be a happy day when it is wholly abandoned" (p. 70). The last page of the book gives us the extraordinary phrase "a neat paraphernalia of human tidiness."

We are, in fact, to keep completely apart God's act in the Incarnation, and all human interpretations and institutions. Neither Bible nor Church is in any sense sacrosanct. The modernity is complete and rigid. There is a queer hardness about the whole business, and though the problems set are very real and urgent problems indeed, the book leaves a curious sense of something not well with the writer as well as of something not well with the Church. It might be indigestion, or frustration, or overwork, or asthma. Whatever it is, it is threatening to spoil quite first-class work, and to turn what should be healthily provocative into something merely provoking.

Incidentally I feel sure that it is not playing the game to drop what appears to be the clerical collar and write a book of this kind under a lay pseudonym.

I am, in fact, annoyed and stimulated by Mr Hadham. I am refreshed and enlightened by Mr Wright. Perhaps, after all, I need them both.

L. W. GRENSTED.

OXFORD.

SOCIETY: NATURAL AND DIVINE. By A. P. Carleton, of the Oxford Mission to Calcutta. S.P.C.K. 6s.

"The doctrine of society is the interest of to-day," and *Society: Natural and Divine* summarizes a scholar-missionary's convictions on the subject. The greater part of the book, which is devoted to the Biblical teaching, is quite admirable; for, in spite of a certain tendency to abandon critical caution over some of the much-debated issues, it is in the main a sound argument, leading with a fascinating freshness of treatment to the familiar conclusion that the Christian Church is the New Israel, and is not concerned with a false contrast between the material and the spiritual, but with the relationship of the society to God—a relationship "sacramentally" expressed through the medium of the material; and that this conception can only be reached by studying the Old and New Testaments as a unity with their

common focus in Jesus the Messiah, through whom " Israel has passed . . . as sand through the neck of an hour-glass, gathering to the one centre and then spreading out." The writer's obvious familiarity with the original Hebrew and Greek, and his flashes of exegetical skill as he swiftly touches most of the notoriously problematic New Testament passages, increase the reader's respect, even if here and there he may feel bound to disagree.

The second and shorter part, which attempts to apply the Biblical doctrine, is naturally the more controversial. Immensely important is the reiteration of that fundamental and Scriptural conviction that the material and the spiritual, as such, are not incompatible, the real antagonism lying elsewhere—namely, between the spiritual and the " worldly." One only wonders whether, in keeping with this, the title ought not to have been " Society: Fallen and Natural "; for to say that " natural society . . . is fallen society " and to set " natural " and " divine " over against one another is to retain the language of a dualism which has been repudiated. However that may be, a further vital principle is that the test of orthodoxy should be " faith in the God who acts," rather than " assent to formulæ." From this broad, twofold basis we approach the problems of the relations between the denominations within the Church, and between " Church " and " State." Regarding the latter, Establishment is defended as potentially a very great opportunity and essentially compatible with the true nature of the Church, in spite of obvious dangers and past failures. The duties of the Church in its present environment are defined as threefold—intercession, witness, and social justice—and she must not be stampeded out of her insistence on man's need of redemption. Very wise is the writer's attitude to rival theories of society. He sees them as largely reactions against false presentations of the true society. " Communism," for example, " is not the enemy; in many ways it is the friend. The enemy is the secular spirit which made Communism to develop on such narrow lines. Most Communists, like their master, have not rejected Christ, because they have never known Him." The same line is taken with some of the Indian non- or anti-Christian movements. To the other great problem—disunity within the Church—his approach is equally humble and great-hearted, but less practical. For in discussing reunion with Rome he oscillates uneasily between a definition of papal authority which empties it of all distinctiveness and one which leaves it as a dictatorship, neither position being conceivable for the opposite party. With regard to Protestants, his spirit is, again, inspiringly fine; but in insisting upon Episcopacy as absolutely essential to the existence of the Church he fails to recognize that this, if true, needs far more proof than he has anywhere given; and his previously accepted " faith in the God who acts " seems now to have been exchanged for an entirely different test.

But in spite of these limitations the book is conspicuously worth reading; and the hope is that a writer of such scholarship and ripe experience and, above all, with so eminently Christian an approach may one day find time to undertake a much more detailed study of the Biblical doctrine of authority. This would be a really weighty contribution to reunion, for he has proved that he can endear himself to his readers as a friend, as well as commanding their respect as a scholar.

CAMBRIDGE. C. F. D. MOULE.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE RELEVANCE OF THE BIBLE. By H. H. Rowley. James Clarke and Co. 6s.

This book deals with general questions of Biblical interpretation, in a pleasant and readable manner, being largely occupied with pointing out the impossibilities of fundamentalism, and seeking to show a better way. But the answer given is of the type with which books on the Bible for a long time past have made us familiar; and it may be judged how far away this book is from the Bible's own theological outlook, by the frequency of such phrases as " rich ethical qualities," " spiritual enrichment," " aglow with God," and " deep religious value," while there is no sufficient recognition of the centrality of the Exodus in the history, and of the vocation of Israel to be God's People. It is odd that while the author declares himself prepared to accept miracles (p. 103), he makes no mention of our Lord's virgin birth in a passage where half a page is devoted to " the simple story of His birth " at Bethlehem (p. 169), nor of the Resurrection in a passage of 10 pages about the Cross, except for one phrase: " that a new self, born of Him, may share His experience of resurrection " (p. 184). It is to be feared that anyone who buys this book in the hope of finding it to be one that would meet the great need for popular books on the Bible from the point of view of Biblical theology will be disappointed. A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

KELHAM.

UPON THIS ROCK. By Emile Cammaerts. Cresset Press. 6s.

" Your pain is only one blade of grass in a field of grief." The words might well serve as text to this record of his response to the agony of bereavement by a distinguished man of letters whose son, killed on service with the Royal Air Force, has gone to swell the ranks of a great and growing majority. Dr Cammaerts breaks the self-denying ordinance which natural reticence would impose in the hope that so personal a confession may

contribute to the spiritual resources of the nation in an exceptional crisis, and to the comfort of those who suffer a similar experience. He acknowledges his debt to several contemporary theologians whose writings have enabled him to sustain his own tragedy, and his book is virtually a recapitulation of their conclusions—which he has made his own—in the context of this special intimate reference. It is not, therefore, and does not pretend to be, an original contribution to thought: its value lies in the private heart-searchings of a sensitive and honest mind, whose "fragile shield has been pierced at last by the spear of a genuine pain." In a way his meditations may be said to be an intellectualization of grief; but the poems in his mother-tongue, interspersed throughout them—of extreme pathos and poignancy—bespeak a deeper and more mystic insight; they are a vivid interpretation of the dictum that he makes elsewhere: "Joy and pain are complementary; we must enjoy life to realize its value, but we must suffer to understand its meaning." Not Stoic fortitude on the one hand, nor Epicurean indifference on the other, can provide the anodyne for grief: there is no easy artificial short-cut either by defiance or escape. Only in the Cross is found the cure; only in God is that eternal life which, in the fellowship of His Son, outlasting death, transfigures all our lesser loves.

GEORGE SEAVER.

HAWARDEN.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: T. H. Hughes, *Psychology and Religious Truth* (7s. 6d.)

DACRE PRESS: Dom Gregory Dix, O.S.B., *A Detection of Aumbries* (3s. 6d.).

FABER: H. S. Bellamy, *The Book of Revelation is History* (8s. 6d.). Robert Sencourt, *King Alfonso* (12s. 6d.).

LONGMANS: J. Armitage, *To Christian England* (5s.).

S.P.C.K.: F. W. Galpin, *In the Garden of the Lord* (2s. 6d.). A. J. Appasamy, *The Gospel and India's Heritage* (8s. 6d.). H. Whitby, *The End of Sacrifice* (2s.).

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd. Guildford and Esher